Simulating the Spread of an Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in California by Axelsen, Brian S.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-06
Simulating the Spread of an Outbreak of Foot and
Mouth Disease in California
Axelsen, Brian S.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
SIMULATING THE SPREAD OF AN OUTBREAK OF 








 Thesis Advisor: Nedialko B. Dimitrov 
 Second Readers: David Alderson 
  Pam Hullinger 
  Mark Stevenson 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE 
June 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Simulating the Spread of an Outbreak of Foot and 
Mouth Disease in California 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Brian S. Axelsen 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.  IRB Protocol number ______N/A______. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
 
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease affecting cloven-hoofed domestic and some wild 
animals.  A hypothetical outbreak of FMD begun in California was recently estimated to have a national impact of up 
to $55 billion, mostly due to international trade restrictions (Carpenter, O’Brien, Hagerman, & McCarl, 2011).  
Therefore, preparedness for an outbreak is a high priority within the livestock industry, and state and federal 
government. 
We use simulation and a designed experiment to identify robust governmental and industrial surveillance 
response strategies to control the spread of FMD.  A strategy is considered robust if it is effective across a number of 
outbreak scenarios and a variety of disease spread characteristics. 
The main contributions of this thesis are:  (1) the development of FMD outbreak scenarios across California 
that can be used in conjunction with a state-of-the-art, animal disease simulation model, and (2) the development and 
analysis of an efficient experimental design that allows for the identification of key parameters affecting the spread 
and containment of an FMD outbreak. 
The analysis of over 400,000 simulations in the experimental design indicates two key areas for the control 
ofFMD:  
(1) surveillance activities at dairy and dairy-like premises are a dominant factor in early identification of the 
disease and increased surveillance leads to lower impacts of an outbreak; and (2) fast initial response and capacity of 
depopulation resources are also key factors in controlling an FMD outbreak, even when no preemptive depopulation 
strategies are considered. 
 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Foot and mouth disease, disease modeling, simulation analysis, nearly 
orthogonal and balanced design, design of experiment, California, InterSpread Plus 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
159 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
SIMULATING THE SPREAD OF AN OUTBREAK OF FOOT AND MOUTH 
DISEASE IN CALIFORNIA 
 
 
Brian S. Axelsen 
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army Reserve 
B.B.A., Texas Christian University, 1994 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 






NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
June 2012 
 
Author:  Brian S. Axelsen 
 
















Robert F. Dell 
Chair, Department of Operations Research 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease affecting cloven-
hoofed domestic and some wild animals.  An A hypothetical outbreak of FMD begun in 
California  was recently estimated to have a national impact of up to $55 billion, mostly 
due to international trade restrictions (Carpenter, O’Brien, Hagerman, & McCarl, 
Carpenter et al.,  2011 ).  Therefore, preparedness for an outbreak is a high priority within 
the livestock industry, and state and federal government. 
We use simulation and a designed experiment to identify robust governmental and 
industrial surveillance response strategies to control the spread of FMD.  A strategy is 
considered robust if it is effective across a number of outbreak scenarios and a variety of 
disease spread characteristics. 
The main contributions of this thesis are:  (1) the development of FMD outbreak 
scenarios across California that can be used in conjunction with a state-of-the-art, animal 
disease simulation model, and (2) the development and analysis of an efficient 
experimental design that allows for the identification of key parameters affecting the 
spread and containment of an FMD outbreak. 
The analysis of over 400,000 simulations in the experimental design indicates two 
key areas for the control of FMD:  (1) surveillance activities at dairy and dairy-like 
premises are a dominant factor in early identification of the disease and increased 
surveillance leads to lower impacts of an outbreak, and (2) fast initial responsiveness 
response and capacity of depopulation resources are also a key factors in controlling an 
FMD outbreak, even when no pre-emptive depopulation strategies are considered. 
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Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease affecting 
cloven-hoofed domestic and some wild animals.  Most adult animals recover from the 
disease, but it debilitates them; leading to severely decreased meat and milk production.  
The economic impact on a country with an FMD outbreak can be extensive due to the 
cost of eradicating the virus, the secondary effects to local economies, and the 
international trade impact on all animal products that the country exports.  For example, 
the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom led to the destruction of approximately 
4 million animals at an estimated economic loss of $5 billion to the food and agriculture 
sector, and a comparable amount to the tourism industry (U.S. General Accounting 
Office [GAO], 2002).  Even though the United States has been free of this disease since 
1929, the Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy has 
listed FMD as one of four animal diseases that are “high priority threats” in its Research 
& Development Plan for 2008–2012 (National Science and Technology Council [NSTC], 
2007). 
We study the spread of FMD in California using a specifically designed  
herd-based, disease-spread simulation software package and an efficient design of 
experiment (DOE) to explore a number of “what-if” scenarios of FMD outbreaks in 
California.  The software package, called InterSpread Plus (ISP), has been used 
extensively to model outbreaks of this disease in modern livestock countries including the 
United Kingdom, Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. 
Our research makes two major contributions to the study and modeling of FMD in 
California.  First, we undertake a significant data development effort to use a  
state-of-the-art animal disease simulation, ISP, to analyze potential FMD outbreaks in 
California.  This data will allow future researchers to study alternative scenarios and 
control strategies as they are developed.  Second, we develop an efficient DOE, which 
allows us to explore 26 disease-spread factors and 46 response factors across 8 outbreak 
scenarios, using hundreds of thousands of simulations, as opposed to a naive strategy that  
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would require more than trillions (273).  In this way, we can perform simulation analysis 
of the output to identify the relevant disease and control factors for the spread of FMD in 
California  
The two major results for the control of FMD, as indicated by our analysis, are: 
 The most important disease surveillance is done at dairy and dairy-like 
facilities, or premises.  We see that the surveillance parameters of these 
premises are the dominant control factors in both decreasing the detection 
time and decreasing the size of the outbreak.  This is likely because these 
types of premises usually have personnel on staff who have daily contact 
with their animals and because the clinical signs of infection in cattle are 
generally easier to detect than in other species.  These characteristics lead 
to decreased time until detection, which leads to quicker implementation 
of controls and smaller outbreaks.  Continued research into how to make 
this type of surveillance as efficient as possible could have a significant 
impact on the size of an outbreak if it ever occurs in California. 
 The size and responsiveness of depopulation resources play a significant 
role in decreasing the size of outbreaks.  This is surprising, because our 
models do not use preemptive depopulation.  Instead, the model only 
depopulates detected premises.  The analysis confirmed that depopulating 
infected premises quickly and significantly limited the spread of the 
disease.  This requires the availability of large amounts of resources in a 
timely manner.  The analysis suggests that if the state does not plan on 
using preemptive depopulation, then depopulation resources should be 
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Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious viral disease affecting 
cloven-hoofed domestic and some wild animals.  The United States has been free of this 
disease since 1929, but preparedness for an outbreak is a high priority within the 
livestock industry, and state and federal government.  The Executive Office of the 
President, Office of Science and Technology Policy has listed FMD as one of four animal 
diseases that are “high priority threats” in its Research & Development Plan for 2008–
2012 (National Science and Technology Council [NSTC], 2007, p. 5).  This document 
goes on to state that: 
An incursion of FMD within U.S. borders could result in severe disruption 
of the dairy, cattle, and swine industries and allied sectors, the loss of 
export markets, and stop movement restrictions that would create 
significant disruption to the national economy (including transportation 
systems, travel, and consumer confidence). 
FMD is a top priority for the state of California in particular.  According to the 
2010 Census of Agriculture, California is ranked #1 in dairy production and #4 in beef 
production in the United States.  The combined market value of these two industries is 
$9.1 billion annually (United States Department of Agriculture National Agricultural 
Statistics Service [NASS], 2010).  An outbreak of FMD is a large potential threat to these 
industries in terms of both their health and economic productivity (Hagerman, McCarl, 
Carpenter, & O’Brien, 2009).  The California Department of Food and Agriculture 
(CDFA) lists FMD as one of two animal diseases that are “potential emergencies” within 
the state.  The CDFA’s Animal Health and Food Safety Services Division (AHFSS) 
maintains several websites devoted to the disease, including general information about 
the disease, livestock producer guides to preventing and reporting suspected occurrences 
of FMD, and emergency preparedness guides in case of an outbreak. 
Because the disease spreads so quickly, authorities tasked with controlling the 
outbreak must move aggressively to implement control measures to stop its geographic 
expansion.  What measures they implement and how they are implemented can have 
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tremendous impacts on both local and state economies.  For example, if movement 
restrictions are applied to too small an area, the disease may spread outside of the 
controlled area and cause a larger outbreak.  If, however, they are applied to an overly 
large area, it may cause undue collateral damage because all industries in those controlled 
areas suffer economic hardship either directly (e.g., to farm revenue due to depopulation 
of infected premises), or indirectly (e.g., to small business revenue due to movement 
restrictions). 
Our research uses simulation and a designed experiment to attempt to determine 
robust governmental and industrial surveillance and response strategies across a number 
of outbreak-starting scenarios and considers a variety of disease-spread parameters.  We 
hope to provide insight to policy makers so that they can be prepared if, and when, an 
outbreak occurs in California. 
B. BACKGROUND 
FMD is extremely contagious and difficult to control.  Its most significant impact 
is generally on cattle and swine, although it also affects sheep, goats, deer, and several 
other, mostly cloven-hoofed, animals.  The virus can be spread by animals, people, 
inanimate objects, or by aerosol.  It is a moderately robust virus that can persist for weeks 
or months given neutral pH and favorable environmental conditions.  There are seven 
distinct serotypes of the virus along with many more subtypes of each serotype.  Any 
vaccine used must be specific to the type and subtype of the virus in order to be most 
effective.  The symptoms of the disease vary in severity with serotype and species 
infected, but FMD is generally characterized by a fever and painful blister-like lesions in 
the mouth, on the tongue and lips, between the hooves, and on the teats of an infected 
animal.  Most adult animals recover from the disease, but it debilitates them, which leads 
to severely decreased meat and milk production.  FMD is not zoonotic, which means that 
it is not transmittable to humans under natural conditions; however, it does indirectly 




depression, posttraumatic stress, and suicides due to the emotional and economic impacts 
of rapid and large-scale depopulation of animals that is sometimes needed to control 
historic outbreaks (United States Animal Health Association (USAHA), 2008). 
The economic impact on a country with an FMD outbreak can be extensive due to 
the cost of eradicating the virus, the secondary effects to local economies, and the 
international trade impact on animal product exports.  The trade impacts could be 
particularly expensive for the United States because all nonpasteurized animal products 
for the entire country would be restricted under international trade rules.  Therefore, an 
outbreak of FMD in California would impact non-infected states such as Iowa and 
Missouri, where there is a large pork products exporting industry.  The United States 
(U.S.) has not had an FMD outbreak since 1929, but a recent study funded by the 
Department of Homeland Security estimated that an outbreak begun in California could 
have a national impact of up to $55 billion if the disease was not detected for 21 days, 
which was the detection delay in the United Kingdom (U.K.) in 2001 (Carpenter et al., 
2011).  That outbreak of FMD in the U.K. led to the destruction of approximately  
4 million animals, at an estimated economic loss of $5 billion to the food and agriculture 
sector, and a comparable amount to the tourism industry (U.S. General Accounting 
Office [GAO], 2002). 
C. CURRENT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE STRATEGIES AGAINST 
FMD 
Mainly due to the potential economic impact of FMD on the country, the U.S. 
government has developed a plan to prevent and control (if necessary) an outbreak of this 
disease.  This plan can be divided into several parts:  prevention, detection, selection of a 
control strategy, and management of the control strategy. 
1. Prevention 
Outbreaks of FMD are constantly occurring globally and the disease is endemic in 
many parts of the world (see Figure 1).  The USDA is the lead government organization 
charged with protecting the country from foreign animal diseases, and it utilizes a 
multilayered defense.  The first layer is outside of our borders, where they conduct 
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multinational outbreak response exercises, monitor reported outbreaks, provide monetary 
and expert resources to affected countries, and help to set up FMD control zones in 
regions such as Central and South America.  The USDA’s next layer is at the national 
borders, where it works alongside U.S. Customs to implement preventative measures for 
international passenger and cargo traffic, livestock and animal product imports, 
international mail, and garbage from international carriers.  U.S. efforts to protect itself 
have been effective for over 80 years, but the magnitude and volume of legal and illegal 
people and products crossing our borders means that the country is still vulnerable to  
the disease. 
 
Figure 1.   FMD outbreaks after 2005 (OIE, 2012) 
2. Detection 
If FMD is detected within the U.S., the federal government, as well as most state 
governments, has developed and tested emergency response plans.  At the federal level, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) would coordinate the response and 
the USDA would be the lead agency.  Some of the more than 20 federal agencies 
involved would be the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide personnel, equipment 




animal carcasses; and the National Park Service to advise on susceptible wildlife 
management.  Since this thesis applies specifically to an outbreak of FMD in California, 
we focus on California’s, as well as the USDA’s, response plans. 
The initial indication of an FMD outbreak will most likely come from a private 
veterinarian called by, or on the staff of, a livestock owner who notices unusual patterns 
of sick animals or significant production losses.  The veterinarian is required by law to 
report a suspected case of FMD to the CDFA.  A government agency, such as the Food 
and Drug Administration, the USDA, or U.S. Customs may also originate a report.  Upon 
notification, the CDFA contacts the USDA and dispatches a Foreign Animal Disease 
Diagnostician (FADD) to collect samples and classify the diagnosis as “unlikely,” 
“possible,” or “highly likely.”  For the first two scenarios, the FADD orders the livestock 
facility to stop all animal movement until lab results rule out FMD.  In the event of a 
diagnosis of “highly likely” by the FADD, the State Veterinarian places a State 
Quarantine on the facility, establishes an appropriate movement control area around the 
premises, and directs that all contacts to the facility be traced back to an appropriate point 
in time.  The FADD then works with the facility to ensure that proper biosecurity 
measures are implemented.  In all three scenarios, the FADD sends the sample to an 
approved National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) lab for further 
evaluation, with the conformational diagnosis being made by the Federal Foreign Animal 
Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL) at Plum Island, New York. 
3. Selection of a Control Strategy 
Once FMD is confirmed by USDA, the CDFA and USDA select response 
strategies to use within the control areas.  These responses could include one of or a 
combination of the following: 
 Stamping-Out, which would depopulate all infected premises, contact 
premises, and at-risk susceptible animals;  
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 Stamping-Out with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter, which modifies 
the Stamping-Out response by vaccinating at-risk susceptible animals 
prior to slaughtering or depopulating them;  
 Stamping-Out with Emergency Vaccination to Live, which is the same as 
Stamping-Out with Emergency Vaccination to Slaughter except that the 
vaccinated animals would be allowed to live out their useful lives; or,  
 Emergency Vaccination without Stamping-Out, which is highly unlikely to 
be used during an initial outbreak, but may be used if the disease becomes 
widespread and resources to stamp-out do not exist. 
The selection of one or a combination of these responses is based on the scale and 
circumstances of the outbreak.  For example, Stamping-Out is most appropriate to a  
well-contained region where the probability of spreading beyond the region is low and 
the resources to depopulate and dispose of the animals are readily available.  Whereas, 
Stamping-Out with Emergency Vaccination to Live may be most appropriate where 
public opinion is opposed to slaughtering uninfected animals, or where there is a need to 
protect high value genetic stock, facilities that have long-lived production animals, or a 
high density population of high risk susceptible animals. 
4. Management of the Control Strategy 
The USDA has several designations for specific locations in the event of an FMD 
outbreak in order to better manage the response to the outbreak.  The responses listed 
above may be used at any of these designated locations.  Premises are the smallest 
designation and identify, among others: 
 Infected Premises (IP), where a presumptive positive or confirmed 
positive case exists; 
 Contact Premises (CP), where susceptible animals may have been 
exposed either directly or indirectly to FMD;  
 Suspect Premises (SP), which is under investigation due to the presence of 
susceptible animals reported to have clinical symptoms similar to FMD; 
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 At-Risk Premises (ARP), which have susceptible animals, but none of 
those susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible with FMD; 
 Monitored Premises (MP), which objectively demonstrate that they are not 
an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises; 
 Free Premises (FP), which are outside of a Control Area and not a 
Contact or Suspect Premises; or 
 Vaccinated Premises (VP), where emergency vaccination has been 
performed.  This may be a secondary premises designation. 
Zones and Areas may surround premises, other zones, or locations where 
vaccination is taking place.  These include: 
 an Infected Zone (IZ), which surrounds Infected Premises; 
 a Buffer Zone (BZ), which surrounds an Infected Zone or Contact 
Premises; 
 a Control Area (CA), which includes the IZ and BZ; 
 a Surveillance Zone (SZ), which surrounds the Control Area; 
 a Vaccination Zone (VZ), which surrounds areas conducting vaccination; 
and 
 a Free Area, which is an area not included in the CA. 
The USDA has stated the minimum sizes of the zones/areas as well as the factors 
that should be used in determining that size.  Examples of zones/areas and their minimum 
sizes are shown in Figure 2 and Table 1.  Examples of the factors that help to determine 
the actual zone/area sizes include:  jurisdictional areas, physical boundaries, premises’ 
characteristics, environmental conditions, and premises biosecurity status (USDA, 2011). 
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Figure 2.   Examples of zones, areas, and premises (From USDA, 2011) 
Table 1.   Minimum sizes of zones and areas (From USDA, 2011) 
The placement of zones and areas can have a major impact on the resource 
requirements needed to control an FMD outbreak.  Large control areas have a higher 
certainty that all of the IPs are contained in the area and a lower probability that the virus 
will spread outside of the control area.  However, they will also be more resource intense, 
have more premises to manage, and have a larger negative economic impact to normal 
business operations of uninfected premises in the zone.  The opposite characteristics will 
be expected of smaller control areas (USDA, 2011). 
Zone/Area Minimum Size 
Infected Zone (IZ) At least 3 km beyond the perimeters of Infected Premises 
(IP) 
Buffer Zone (BZ) At least 7 km beyond the perimeter of IZ 
Control Area (CA) At least 10 km beyond the perimeter of the closest IP (sum 
of the IZ and BZ) 
Surveillance Zone (SZ) At least 10 km beyond the perimeter of the CA 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
FMD is well documented and has been reported in the literature since 1546 
(Knowles, 1990).  In light of this, we will focus this literature review on studies 
conducted to define disease-spread characteristics, studies that focus on an outbreak of 
FMD in California, and studies that use InterSpread Plus (ISP), the simulation software 
package we have chosen to use in our analysis of FMD spread. 
The United States Animal Health Association’s “Gray Book” (USAHA, 2008) 
provides a general overview of FMD, many of the disease-spread characteristics, as well 
as some of the strategies to control the spread.  It is written for an audience of 
veterinarians and covers many foreign animal diseases.  Mardones, Perez, Sanchez, 
Alkhamis, and Carpenter (2010) discuss the infectiousness durations for various 
susceptible species and attempt to parameterize them for use in simulation models.  
Sutmoller, Barteling, Olascoaga, and Sumption (2003) provide great detail on a number 
of topics covering FMD, including its epidemiology, vaccines, and control strategies.  
McLaws and Ribble (2007) study the relationship between outbreak size and early 
detection during outbreaks between 1992 and 2003, and find that there is no direct 
relationship.  They attribute the movement of animals through markets as being the most 
critical factor in the size of an outbreak. 
There have been several studies that simulate the spread of FMD in California, 
although most are limited to the Central Valley, where many of the large dairy facilities 
are located.  Pineda-Krch, O’Brien, Thunes, and Carpenter (2010), however, conduct 
simulations of several areas of the state in places where reports of hunters killing feral 
hogs are high.  Their results show that the duration and size of outbreaks are impacted 
greatly by where the outbreak occurred and on what type of facility, but they also find 
that a statewide movement ban decreases both of those measures consistently across 
location and type of facility infected.  Bates, Thurmond, and Carpenter (2001) send 
surveys to livestock producers and others who would regularly visit livestock premises 
(e.g., veterinarians and hoof trimmers) in three central California counties in order to 
determine direct and indirect contact rates and movement distances in the study area.  
Direct contacts describe animal movement between two locations, while indirect contacts 
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describe the movement of humans, vehicles, equipment, or other mechanical means of 
spreading the virus between two locations.  We use the results of this study extensively in 
this thesis to parameterize the network movement of the virus.  Other California studies 
are by Kobayashi, Carpenter, Dickey, and Howitt (2007) and Carpenter, O’Brien, 
Hagerman, and McCarl (2011), which simulate the economic impact of an outbreak in 
California, and Carpenter, Christiansen, Dickey, Thunes, and Hullinger (2007), which 
determine the impact of an outbreak begun at the 2005 California State Fair. 
For this thesis, we use ISP as the simulation software package for our experiments 
(Massey University, 2008).  Initially developed for FMD at Massey University in  
New Zealand, ISP can be used to model any contagious disease and has been used 
extensively to model animal disease outbreaks before, during, and after they occurred in 
modern livestock countries including the United Kingdom, South Korea, and  
New Zealand.  It is a “herd-based” model, where the unit spreading the disease is a farm 
or other livestock premises instead of an individual animal, and is stochastic, meaning 
that it includes randomness while modeling the disease spread. 
The most prominent use of ISP was during the FMD outbreak in the U.K. in 2001.  
In writing about that outbreak, Keeling (2005) acknowledges the flexibility and modeling 
capability of ISP, but also states that it can be confusing and relies heavily on expert 
opinion for its parameterization.  Yoon et al., (2006) utilize ISP to model alternative 
control strategies to those that were used during the 2002 outbreak of FMD in the 
Republic of Korea.  They find that several proposed strategies could have reduced both 
the size and variability of the predicted number of infected farms.  Dubé (2009) and 
Kostova-Vassilevska, Bates, Thurmond, and Carpenter (2004) provide descriptions of 
ISP in their studies of FMD models. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The main topic of this thesis will be to determine the best sizes of these areas and 
zones for the control of an FMD outbreak, while minimizing the negative impacts of 
those controls on the livestock industry in California.  We decompose the main topic into  
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more specific questions in order to focus our research.  We believe that by answering the 
following research questions, we can contribute to the body of knowledge of FMD spread 
and its control in California. 
 Which disease spread parameters, such as the probability of disease 
transmission from a market or the rate at which animals are moved off of a 
large dairy farm, are most important to the simulation of an outbreak of 
FMD in California? 
 In response to a variety of outbreak scenarios, what are the optimal sizes 
of Control Areas and Surveillance Zones that efficiently eradicate the 
disease and also minimize the economic impact on the livestock industry? 
 How often should livestock facilities be screened for FMD prior to and 
during an outbreak? 
 Which are the most dangerous outbreak scenarios modeled in this thesis 
for California? 
This thesis makes several contributions from our research to the study and 
modeling of FMD in California. 
 We undertake a significant data development effort to use a state-of-the-
art animal disease simulation, ISP, to analyze potential FMD outbreaks in 
California.  This data will also be available to future researchers. 
 We develop an efficient design of experiment that allows us to simulate 
hundreds of thousands of possible FMD outbreaks in a relatively short 
amount of time.  Then, we perform simulation analysis to identify key 
parameters affecting the spread and containment of an FMD outbreak. 
 Finally, we develop and analyze eight specific outbreak scenarios relevant 
to FMD in California. 
The ultimate objective is to provide insight into the effectiveness of various 
control strategies for application in policy decisions. 
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II. METHODOLOGY AND DATA DEVELOPMENT 
We use a simulation model and a designed experiment to evaluate robust 
governmental response strategies across a number of outbreak scenarios and a variety of 
disease parameters.  We seek strategies that minimize the overall negative impact of the 
disease, whether that impact is caused by the disease itself or by the implemented disease 
control strategy.  To that end, we divide this chapter into several sections.  In Section A, 
we discuss the general usage of simulation to model FMD, some of the simulation 
software packages considered, and finally our choice of a software package.  In  
Section B, we describe the dataset we received to input into the software, and how we 
interpret and modify this dataset to be able to input it into the software.  In Section C, we 
describe the parameters used within the software to model the outbreak and its control, as 
well as the initial infection scenarios we developed.  In Section D, we show the results of 
the initial plausibility testing of our model.  Finally, in Section E, we describe the purpose 
and development of our experimental design and the measures we use to evaluate the 
effectiveness, robustness, and impact of various control strategies on the outbreak and the 
livestock industry in California.  In our research, we use the term “farm” to describe the 
location where a group of animals is primarily housed and cared for on a permanent or 
semi permanent basis and “premises” to describe locations that could be farms or other 
livestock premises, such as markets or sales yards. 
A. SIMULATION MODELLING OF FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE (FMD) 
1. Why Model? 
Simulation modeling is used extensively to model FMD.  Roger Morris (2008, 
slide 2) of Massey University lists the objectives of modeling a disease: 
 To understand complex biological processes, and identify key features 
 To test a biological hypothesis 
 To predict the effect of interventions on occurrence of a disease 
 To compare these predictions with reality after the event 
 To guide difficult (e.g., nonrepeatable) management decisions 
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Our simulation will focus on the third and fifth of these as we seek to answer the research 
questions given in Chapter I, Section E. 
2. Choosing a Simulation Software Package or Simulation Model 
The choice of a model or software package to conduct the simulation is important 
because the use of a reputable software package enables us to have better confidence in 
the model’s stability, verification, and validation, and thus the likelihood of producing a 
useful output.  This is especially important when considering that we seek to inform 
policy decisions through the use of our model.  In the next few paragraphs, we describe 
some of the current models and software packages used and our choice for the purposes 
of this project and its characteristics. 
Several models are currently in use to simulate the outbreak of livestock disease.  
In addition to ISP, we also considered AusSpread (Garner & Beckett, 2005) and the 
North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM) (Harvey et al., 2007).  Both 
are stochastic state transition models similar to ISP, but AusSpread is run using a 
Geographic Information System (GIS) called MapInfo.  This allows the model output to 
be displayed on detailed maps.  NAADSM is a stand-alone package that is easier to 
automate, but does not display the output information as well.  Both are spatial in that 
they are able to model the proximity between livestock premises. 
In 2005, AusSpread, ISP, and NAADSM were compared at a workshop on FMD 
modeling and policy development by the Quadrilateral (QUADS) countries (Australia, 
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States).  The QUADS compared the results of 
these models, using several FMD scenarios.  Even though AusSpread and ISP are able to 
explicitly model the network spread of FMD, while NAADSM is not—although there are 
methods within that model to at least partially account for network spread  
(Dubé, 2009)—the results were similar.  Although there were statistically significant 
differences between the outputs of the three models for a given outbreak scenario, the 
researchers in attendance believed that any decisions based on the output of each model 
would not have differed (Dubé et al., 2007).  Ultimately, we chose to use ISP because it  
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is a well-known and well-used software package that is able to model the spatial, 
temporal, and network spread of FMD, and is easily automated to run on multiple 
networked computers.  The latter is important to the use of an experimental design. 
3. Characteristics of the Chosen Model 
ISP is a stochastic, state-transition model where the premises are in one of several 
states at any time.  Examples of these states are:  susceptible to infection, infected with 
the disease, or immune to the disease.  The software user is also allowed to define 
additional states within the model, such as whether the premises are in a control area or a 
vaccination zone.  Premises may be in multiple states at one time (see Figure 3).  There 
are constraints on the allowable transitions from one state to another.  For example, in 
order for premises to move from “in Vaccination Zone” to “Vaccinated,” a “Vaccination 
Resource” must be available to vaccinate the premises.  Having an available Vaccination 
Resource would be called a “trigger” for this state transition.  A table with a mapping of 
all of the state transitions used in this model and their triggers is included in Table 2.  ISP 
separately represents many transmission processes, disease characteristics, and control 
methods in both space and time.  All of these processes and characteristics help 
determine what state premises are in at a particular point in time.  We provide details of 
these processes in Section C and an overview in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3.   States used in the model 
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Table 2.   The state trigger matrix.  This matrix shows which triggers allow premises to 
move into a new state.  Depending on the states involved, the new state may be in 
addition to or a replacement of the original state.  For example, the only way that 
a farm can move into the state “In Control Area” is by an infected premises being 
detected within the control area, outside the radius distance from the farm.  In this 
example, the farm described would retain the state “Infected” and have an 




Figure 4.   The transmission processes, disease characteristics, and control methods 
used in our simulation.  Notice that some overlap exists between 
“Transmission Processes” and “Disease Characteristics.”  Some 
parameters listed under “Movements” are actually characteristics of the 
disease. 
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B. DATA DESCRIPTION 
In this section, we describe the inputs required by the ISP software.  Specifically, 
we describe the dataset acquired for use in our modeling and our procedure to interpret 
and modify it for use by ISP.   
1. Description of the Dataset 
Although CDFA maintains careful statistics on the location and sizes of 
individual farms in California, such information is proprietary and not available to the 
public for modeling or analysis.  The dataset we use in this thesis is described in Melius, 
Robertson, and Hullinger (2006) and includes 25,655 premises locations organized into 
the seven columns described below.  A sample from the original data is shown in Table 3.  
The data were developed from publicly available, county-level, aggregated statistics of 
livestock premises provided by the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) 
(NASS, 2010).  As such, they are an approximation of the locations, sizes, animal types, 
and production types of the livestock premises in the state of California.  The location 
coordinates shown are heterogeneous random locations, selected based on a weighting 
scheme using the altitude, flatness, human population, and land use of an area.  The size 
of the premises is selected by uniformly varying the size according to premises type so 
that the average size of each premises type is preserved for each county (Hullinger, 
2012).  We interpreted the original data as described below: 
 Premises:  a concatenation of the premises type name and the unique 
identifier for each premise. 
 ID:  an integer representing a unique identifier for each premise (same 
integer as the unique identifier in “Premises”). 
 Type:  a numeric code for the type of premises.  Included in the data were 
26 of these codes.  Premises populated with cattle are assigned codes 
between 1 and 99; those populated with swine are assigned codes between 
100 and 199; those populated with sheep are assigned codes between  
200 and 299; and those populated with goats are assigned codes between 
300 and 399.  Additionally, code 511 indicates a cattle market and code 
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512 indicates a swine market.  We give a complete listing of the type of 
codes used in the original data in Table 4. 
 Size:  an integer designating the number of animals on the premises.  We 
assume that only one type of animal is on each of the premises. 
 FIPS:  the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) code for the 
state and county in which the premise is located. 
 Lat:  Latitude of the centroid of the randomized premise location. 
 Long:  Longitude of the centroid of the randomized premise location. 
Table 3.   A sample of the original data provided by Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL)  
Premises ID Type Size FIPS Lat Long 
Dairy(L):0 0 33  940 6115 39.01372910 -121.5098953
Dairy(L):1 1 33  1,379 6115 39.29288864 -121.5932312
Dairy(L):2 2 33  1,819 6115 39.17738724 -121.4760590
Dairy(L):3 3 33  2,258 6115 39.26313400 -121.5667267
Stocker(S):
4 4 61           12 6115 39.10063934 -121.4598846
Stocker(S):

















Table 4.   Descriptive Statistics of the Data by Premises Type.  Premises column includes 
the following codes:  B-Backyard, S-Small, M-Medium, L-Large.  A description 

















Beef(B) cattle 24 44,396            5,673     1          10          7.826         1.39          
Dairy(S) cattle 31 7,243              103        13        174        70.320        43.35         
Dairy(M) cattle 32 26,900            103        202       495        261.165      58.87         
Dairy(L) cattle 33 2,649,565       1,526     506       7,458     1,736.281   1,057.47    
Dairy(B) cattle 34 1,518              433        1          9            3.506         1.85          
CowCalf(S) cattle 41 458,635          4,877     10        473        94.040        61.83         
CowCalf(L) cattle 43 423,605          237        521       75,512   1,787.363   5,424.75    
Feedlot(S) cattle 51 7,965              95          11        381        83.842        81.28         
Feedlot(L) cattle 53 563,073          30          1,102    49,667   18,769.100 17,135.79  
Stocker(S) cattle 61 199,791          1,952     11        496        102.352      89.49         
Stocker(L) cattle 63 175,339          139        212       18,933   1,261.432   2,058.68    
DCalfRanch(L) cattle 73 576,634          44          1,314    34,276   13,105.318 9,070.17    
Swine(B) swine 114 5,287              1,203     1          16          4.395         2.33          
SwineFWean(S) swine 121 1,653              15          37        426        110.200      100.37       
SwineFinish(S) swine 131 4,904              49          31        507        100.082      92.08         
SwineFFeeder(S) swine 151 2,267              24          31        426        94.458        84.84         
SwineFFeeder(L) swine 153 23,840            2            11,920  11,920   11,920.000 N/A
SwineFarFin(S) swine 161 8,371              87          29        552        96.218        94.19         
SwineFarFin(L) swine 163 107,280          9            8,280    15,560   11,920.000 2,573.87    
Sheep(S) sheep 211 94,524            1,092     26        375        86.560        51.07         
Sheep(L) sheep 213 474,764          78          1,365    33,178   6,086.718   4,639.32    
Sheep(B) sheep 214 26,088            2,893     1          23          9.018         4.87          
Goats goat 310 104,596          2,296     18        244        45.556        31.17         
Goats(B) goat 314 26,175            2,689     1          19          9.734         5.07          
Market(Cattle) cattle 511 2250 15 150 150 150 N/A
Market(Swine) swine 512 100 1 100 100 100 N/A
Grand Total 6,016,763    25,665 1         75,512 234.435   1,394.04  
2. Our Procedure to Interpret and Modify the Dataset for Use in ISP 
Each run of an ISP model requires several inputs.  These take the form of text 
files and include: 
 a “Farm File” that describes the premises in the study area; 
 a “Contact Location” File that describes the markets and other gathering 
places of animals from multiple locations; 
 an “Epidemic History File” that lists the premises which are in the 
“infected” and/or “detected” states at the beginning of the simulation; and 
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 a “Zone File” listing the boundaries of the area of study in the form of a 
series of coordinates forming a polygon. 
We describe these inputs in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
a. The Farm File 
This file is essential to ISP because it describes in detail the area to be 
simulated.  At a minimum, it must include: 
 Cartesian coordinates defining where susceptible animals are located (can 
be in the form of a centroid or polygon, but here we use the centroid of the 
premises); 
 the number of  animals located at each of the premises; 
 and a premises type for each location (e.g., large dairy, small cattle 
feedlot, backyard swine premises). 
An arbitrary number of additional columns of user-defined data can also 
be included in the farm file to further describe the modeling environment.  Next, we 
describe the development of our farm file. 
In order to develop this farm file, we create a computer program, or 
“script,”  written in the R Programming Language (R Development Core Team, 2012) to 
manipulate the data from the format described above to a text file for import into ISP.  
Our first task is to transform the latitude/longitude coordinates provided in our dataset to 
integer Cartesian coordinates, as required by ISP.  We first add a “zone” column to each 
of the premises in the farm file and populate it with an integer between 1 and 6, which 
corresponds to the correct California Coordinate System (CCS83) zone to use when 
transforming the latitude/longitude columns to northerly/easterly coordinates.  The units 
of the CCS83 coordinate systems are meters.  The correct zone is found by mapping the 
FIPS code to the CCS83 zone listed in California Department of Transportation 
(Caltrans) (1993).  We then use R script, which incorporates the R package “rgdal” 
(Stevenson, 2012) as a template to transform the data from latitude/longitude to 
northerly/easterly coordinates.  We are unable to use the correct zone for each FIPS code 
while keeping the correct spatial relationship between the zones.  So, we use Zone 3 as 
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the projection for all of the premises locations.  From our initial analysis of the distortion 
this causes between premises in the far north and far south of the state, it appears that the 
incorrect zone usage will not adversely affect our analysis of the simulation. 
Next, we split the “Size” column to show the number of each animal 
species on each premises.  We add five additional columns to indicate species (cattle, 
swine, sheep, goat, and other) and initially populate them with zeros.  We develop a 
mapping table between the “type” column and a “species” column based on the type 
described by the “Premises” column in the original data, and use an R script to copy the 
number in the “Size” column to the appropriate species column. 
Finally, we create another R script to determine the distance between each 
of the premises and all other premises in the dataset.  This allows us to add six columns 
to the data to describe the density of premises and animals within a 3-, 10-, and  
20-kilometer (km) radii from each of the premises in the dataset.  We will use these 
columns to help determine the impact of premises density and animal density on how the 
disease spreads within California.  These computations are subject to the fact that the 
locations given in the dataset are generated by an algorithm and are not the actual 
locations of premises.  However, we assume that the generated data is representative of 
the true locations enough to use these densities in our analysis.  We show the 
distributions of the densities of premises and animals within the state in Figure 5.  We 
show similar information in Figures 6 and 7, but display it so that the reader can visualize 
where the densely populated areas are located in California.  We then show a sample of 
the farm file in its final form in Table 5 and describe its columns below. 
 id:  unique identifier (same as original data) 
 type:  numerical code for premises type (same as original data) 
 FIPS:  the FIPS code for the state and county in which the premises are 
located (same as original data) 
 cattle:  number of cattle on the premises 
 swine:  number of swine on the premises 
 sheep:  number of sheep on the premises 
 goat:  number of goats on the premises 
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 other:  number of other animals on the premises (all zeros for this dataset) 
 premises:  description of the type of premises.  We develop this column 
from the “Premises” column in the original dataset.  After splitting the 
original column into two columns, a string representing the premises type 
name and an integer representing the unique identifier, we remove the 
unique identifier column because it is a duplicate of “id.” 
 premises_3k:  number of other premises within a 3-km radius of the given 
premises 
 animal_3k:  number of animals (all species) within a 3-km radius of the 
given premises 
 premises_10k:  number of other premises within a 3-km radius of the 
given premises 
 animal_10k:  number of animals (all species) within a 3-km radius of the 
given premises 
 premises_20k:  number of other premises within a 3-km radius of the 
given premises 
 animal_20k:  number of animals (all species) within a 3-km radius of the 
given premises 
 xcoord:  easterly coordinate (transformed from longitude using a CCS83 
Zone 3 projection) 
 ycoord:  northerly coordinate (transformed from latitude using a CCS83 
Zone 3 projection) 
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Figure 5.   Histograms and descriptive statistics of the within 20-km densities of 
premises and animals.  The histograms show the proportion of premises 
(y-axis) that have premises or animal densities of the amount shown along 
the x-axis.  One interesting comparison between these two densities is how 
differently they are shaped.  Premises densities are much more uniformly 
distributed between densities of 0 and 525 premises and the distribution is 
bimodal.  Animal densities, however, are highly skewed, with almost 50% 
of the premises having densities of less than 25,000 animals. 
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Figure 6.   Contour plot showing the density of premises within 20 km of each 
premise in the dataset.  Contour lines indicate that premises within the 




Figure 7.   Contour plot showing the density of animals within 20 km of each of the 
premises in the dataset.  Contrast the location of the animal densities in 
this plot with the premises densities in Figure 6 and notice how the most 
premises-dense areas do not necessarily correspond to the most animal-
dense areas.  For example, areas in Northern California are premises 
dense, but are not animal dense. 
Table 5.   Example of the farm file loaded as input into ISP 













0 33 6115 2 940    0 0 0 0 Dairy(L) 16 143 705 1192 3948 23866 1912519.926 779478.177471014;;
1 33 6115 2 1,379 0 0 0 0 Dairy(L) 33 175 387 2289 9363 16617 1905663.556 810556.164516908;;
2 33 6115 2 1,819 0 0 0 0 Dairy(L) 18 167 467 2243 6213 19549 1915640.347 797618.708362427;;
3 33 6115 2 2,258 0 0 0 0 Dairy(L) 35 205 396 3778 10141 17044 1907912.902 807225.65922504;;
4 61 6115 2 12      0 0 0 0 Stocker(S) 25 158 594 606 5444 18911 1916950.823 789082.385581495;;
5 61 6115 2 15      0 0 0 0 Stocker(S) 36 182 380 2290 9576 16439 1907978.569 811080.21527166;;  
b. The Contact Location File 
We create another R script to generate a text file to describe the locations 
of cattle and swine markets.  These are subsets of the farm file where “type” equals “511” 
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for cattle and “512” for swine.  We then delete the columns not required by ISP; leaving 
only the coordinates for the market locations (see Table 6). 


















2087141.126 495456.172  
c. The Epidemic History File 
This file describes specifically which premises are currently infected and 
if they are detected.  If the infected premises are not currently detected, it will also state 
on which day the infected premises are detected.  During initial plausibility testing of the 
model, we include one randomly selected cattle premise from Central California without 
a time until detection in this file.  This premise is a Cow/Calf operation, with 168 cattle in 
a high premises-dense area near Redding, California. 
d. The Zone File 
In order to show a rough estimate of the area of analysis, California, we 
construct a polygon shape file by using Google Maps to find latitude/longitude 




into CCS83 coordinates that can be used by ISP.  Zone 3 is used to transform all 
coordinate pairs of the polygon.  Figure 8 shows all of the coordinate data included in all 
of the ISP input files combined on a single plot. 



































Figure 8.   California Premises Locations:  Shown are the locations of all coordinate 
data input into ISP for the initial plausibility testing of the model. 
C. SIMULATION SOFTWARE PARAMETER AND INITIAL INFECTION 
SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT 
Our first task is to determine a plausible model for how the disease could spread 
through California without any controls.  This is not to say that this model is predictive of 




outbreak could spread.  Then, we develop a model using a generic control strategy and 
the same disease spread parameter settings as the uncontrolled model’s settings.  In 
Chapter III, we describe and compare the results of this plausibility testing. 
In order to accomplish the development of these two models, we assembled a 
team at the International Data Farming Workshop held March 25–30, 2012, at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California to study the problem.  The team included 
several experts in simulation modeling, computer science, and two veterinarians who are 
currently students of the School of Veterinary Medicine at the University of California, 
Davis and are studying to attain a Master of Preventive Veterinary Medicine (MPVM) 
degree.  This team helped us determine the sets of parameters for both the spread of the 
disease as well as many of the control parameters shown in Section 4.  We divide the 
section into six subsections: 
 Overview of the Control File, which briefly describes the text file used to 
input parameter settings into ISP.  The control file contains one row 
pertaining to each parameter described in the next three topics. 
 Development of the Model Parameters, which describes the parameters 
affecting how the model is run.  These include such things as the random 
number generator to use and the number of iterations to run the 
simulation. 
 Development of the Disease Spread Parameters, which describes the 
network and spatial parameters affecting how the disease is spread from 
premises to premises during the simulation. 
 Development of the Disease Spread Control Parameters, which 
describes the strategies and policies to control the spread of the disease as 
well as the constraints to those strategies and policies. 
 Development of Starting Scenarios, which describes the initially 
infected premises for eight different scenarios that we model. 
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1. Overview of the Control File 
ISP is designed to operate from the command line of a Linux- or Windows-based 
single computer, or multiple networked computers, with only one argument specifying 
the control file to be used by the software to simulate disease spread.  The control file 
describes to ISP how the model, disease, and control parameters are used to simulate the 
spread of a herd-based disease, both temporally and spatially, through a population.  The 
development of the control file can be accomplished through the use of a text editor, by a 
scripting software language, or by the Control File Editor graphic user interface, which is 
packaged with the Windows version of ISP.  This text file method enables the modeler to 
automate the model to make many different runs of a simulation using many different 
scenarios or include different farm, market, or epidemic history files, depending on the 
focus of the analysis.  We show a sample control file in Appendix B. 
2. Development of the Model Parameters 
The model parameters section of the control file describes to ISP some basic 
information about how the model should be run.  In our model, we include the number of 
iterations to be completed during the run, the number of time periods to model, a specific 
random number generator and seed to use during the run, the maximum infected premises 
allowed during the iteration, and a set of user-defined farm states.  The parameter settings 
and the rationale we use to develop them are given below. 
 Iteration Count:  100.  This is a medium-sized number of runs chosen to 
satisfy our computational limitations.  The statistical significance from the 
experiments is discussed in Chapter V. 
 Time Period Count:  We use 100 days during the experimental design and 
40 days during our initial testing.  Similar to the iteration count, we 
consider 100 days as a medium-sized number that gives us a good idea of 
disease behavior without overtaxing processing capability. 
 Seed:  Randomly chosen using a Mersenne Twister generator (Matsumoto 
& Nishimura, 1998). 
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 Random Generator Name:  TRandomMotherOfAll, which is a low-
resolution, low-speed generator with low memory usage (Stevenson, 
2012). 
 Max Infected Farms:  7,700, which is 30% of the total number of premises 
in our dataset.  We set this limit because we feel that if 30% of premises in 
California are infected, the control measures used at the beginning of the 
outbreak will be considered ineffective and be replaced with a new 
strategy. 
 User-Defined Farm States 
o In Control Area:  Premises have been placed in the Control Area.  
We trigger this state either when the premises are infected and 
detected, or when another premise located at a distance less than or 
equal to the designated Control Area outside radius has been 
detected. 
o In Surveillance Zone:  Premises have been placed in the 
Surveillance Zone.  We trigger this state when another premise 
located at a distance less than or equal to the designated 
Surveillance Zone outside radius has been detected. 
o In Vaccination Zone:  Premises have been placed in the 
Vaccination Zone.  We trigger this state when another premise 
located at a distance less than or equal to the designated 
Vaccination Zone outside radius has been detected. 
o Waiting for Vaccination:  The premises have been placed in the 
Vaccination Zone and are awaiting resources to become available 
to begin vaccination of the animals on the premises. 
o Processing Vaccination:  Resources have begun vaccination of the 
animals on the premises, but are not yet finished with the process. 
o Vaccinated:  All animals on the premises have been vaccinated. 
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o Waiting for Depopulation:  The premises have been infected, 
detected, and are awaiting resources to become available to begin 
depopulation of the animals on the premises. 
o Processing Depopulation:  Resources have begun depopulation of 
the animals on the premises, but are not yet finished with the 
process. 
o Depopulated:  All animals on the premises have been depopulated. 
o likeDairy:  Premises have similar surveillance practices to a dairy 
facility.  These include premises designated as:  Dairies (Small-S, 
Medium-M, Large-L), Feedlots (S, L), and Dairy Calf Ranches. 
o likeDairy before first detection:  Premises are designated as 
“likeDairy” and no premises have been detected during the current 
iteration. 
o likeDairy after first detection:  Premises are designated as 
“likeDairy” and at least one of the premises has been detected 
during the current iteration. 
o Additional states that were defined, but not used, during this 
experiment were Delayed Vaccinated and Delayed Depopulated. 
The SetState section of the control file allows the ISP user to designate some 
types of premises to a certain modeling state at the beginning of the simulation.  We used 
this section to designate a modeling state of likeDairy to all Dairy (S, M, L), Feedlot (S, 
L), and Dairy Calf Ranches, and we use this modeling state to specify certain surveillance 
parameters to use just for dairy and dairy-like premises during the simulation. 
3. Development of the Disease-Spread Parameters 
ISP has the ability to model many different disease-spread parameters, which 
describe the network and spatial disease spread from premises to premises during the 
simulation.  The sections in the control file describing these parameters are titled:  
movement type, route, fixed route, local spread, airborne spread, and infectivity.  Of 
these, we do not use route and fixed route, which model specific routes between premises 
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(e.g., a milk truck pickup route between several dairy facilities), because data at this level 
of detail is not currently available through public sources for California.  We also do not 
use the airborne spread parameter within ISP.  Instead, we assume that varying the local 
spread distance parameter will account for the majority of the aerosol spread of the 
disease.  This assumption is reasonable given that we are modeling a broad range of local 
spread distances and the fact that some types/subtypes of the FMD virus do not spread 
long distances by aerosol.  Additionally, serotype O, which has been responsible for 
many recent outbreaks in temperate countries, has shown little tendency for airborne 
spread (Stevenson, 2012).  We subdivide this section of the thesis by describing the 
following sections in the control file: 
 Movement Type:  Network spread of the disease 
 Local Spread:  Spatial spread of the disease over time 
 Infectivity:  Disease characteristics affecting disease spread 
a. Movement Type 
Even though the zones/areas discussed in Chapter I and Figure 2 seem to 
be purely spatial in design, the USDA has recognized that the network spread of FMD 
should be considered when designating these zones/areas and recommends the use of 
these types of factors in those determinations.  Since the virus is easily spread in many 
ways, direct and indirect contacts between livestock facilities could happen over greater 
distances than are accounted for in a purely spatial design.  Direct contact at highly 
connected operations, such as livestock markets, occupy a central role in the flow of 
animals and should be dealt with differently than other premises in an outbreak area 
(Dubé, 2009).  Indirect contact, such as by artificial insemination teams or hoof trimmers, 
may be higher at different types of operations than others.  In a survey of livestock 
facilities in California, for example, large swine operations had an over 3,600% higher 
mean reported monthly indirect contact rate than small beef farms (Bates et al., 2001).  
This seems to be a function of both the size of the herd as well as the species at  
the facility. 
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In order to account for the network spread of the disease, ISP uses 
movement types to model direct and indirect contact between animals.  For our analysis, 
we model 18 movement types.  The first 11 describe individual farm-to-farm movements, 
the next two model farm-to-market and market-to-farm movements, and the last five 
model indirect farm-to-farm movements. 
For each of these movement types, we developed the movement distances 
and corresponding probabilities using empirical distributions described by Bates et al. 
(2001), in which the authors study central California direct and indirect livestock contact 
rates and movement distances.  We choose to model all direct and indirect movement 
frequencies within our model, with Poisson distributions with parameters, as shown in 
Table 7.  We estimate the probability of each direct contact movement type to reach 
different distance bands by using the data shown in several graphs in Bates et al. (2001) 
and show those probabilities in Table 8.  The probability of transmission of FMD among 
different species is a poorly understood parameter and is not easily defined across 
serotypes and subtypes of the disease.  Orsel, Bouma, Dekker, Stegeman, and De Jong 
(2009) study the virus transmission of piglets, lambs, and calves, and compare them to 
each other.  After analyzing their study, we set the probability of transmission given a 
farm-to-farm movement occurs to be a function of the species of animal located on the 
premises where the movement began.  The probability of transmission for sheep and 
goats are set to a constant probability, p.  For determining a plausible uncontrolled 
spread, p = 0.2.  We set the probabilities for cattle and pigs to 1.821 (1 )p   and 
801 (1 )p  , respectively.  This equates to saying that a pig is about 80 times more 






Table 7.   Shipments from livestock premises.  We consider the numeric premises “Type 
Codes” from our data to be equivalent to the “Facility Types” from Bates et al. 
(2001).  Green highlighted columns in this table show the data or calculations we 
add to the authors’ data.  The “Actual Mean” column is calculated by multiplying 
the “Mean Shipments” by the “% reporting shipments.”  The “Average Daily 
Shipments ” is the “Actual Mean” column divided by 30 to determine a daily 
rate.  This column was used in determining the plausibility of the model.  The 
similarly calculated “Average Daily Shipments +/– 95% CI” columns are used as 
high and low limits within the experimental design for their corresponding 



















24, 34, 114, 214, 314 Backyard 31 29 93.55% 1.7 0 4.2 1.590 0.053 0.000 0.140
310 Goat 3 3 100.00% 6.6 0 16.8 6.600 0.220 0.000 0.560
211, 213 Sheep 15 15 100.00% 7.9 0 18.8 7.900 0.263 0.000 0.627
Beef
51, 61 < 250 52 52 100.00% 0.9 0.5 1.3 0.900 0.030 0.017 0.043
53, 63 >= 250 29 28 96.55% 2 0 3 1.931 0.064 0.000 0.100
Dairy
31, 32 < 1000 54 52 96.30% 8.2 4.3 12.1 7.896 0.263 0.143 0.403
none 1000 - 1999 54 54 100.00% 17.4 12.5 22.3 17.400 0.580 0.417 0.743
33 >= 2000 48 48 100.00% 16.4 11.9 20.9 16.400 0.547 0.397 0.697
Calf/heifer
41 < 250 10 10 100.00% 0.7 0.3 1.1 0.700 0.023 0.010 0.037
43, 73 >= 250 4 4 100.00% 22.4 0 58.8 22.400 0.747 0.000 1.960
Swine
121, 131, 151, 161 < 2000 12 11 91.67% 4.8 1.1 8.5 4.400 0.147 0.037 0.283
153, 163 >= 2000 5 5 100.00% 20 0.2 39.8 20.000 0.667 0.007 1.327
t = 30
Shipments from the Livestock Premise
 
 
Table 8.   Movement Distance Probabilities used to model farm-to-farm movements.  We 
estimate the probabilities from the corresponding graphs in Bates et al. (2001).  
Again, we consider the numeric premises “Type Codes” from our data to be 
equivalent to the “Facility Types” from Bates et al. (2001). 
Type Code Facility type 19,000 39,000 59,000 79,000 99,000 119,000 139,000 159,000 179,000 
24, 34, 114, 214, 
314 Backyard 0.615 0.110 0.025 0.060 0.010 0.035 0.010 0.000 0.135
211, 213, 310 Goat/Sheep 0.365 0.160 0.090 0.035 0.010 0.000 0.015 0.025 0.300
51, 53, 61, 63 Beef 0.390 0.220 0.125 0.055 0.025 0.010 0.020 0.015 0.140
31, 32, 33 Dairy 0.570 0.255 0.035 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.005 0.105
41, 43, 73 Calf/heifer 0.410 0.145 0.205 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.220
121, 131, 151, 
153, 161, 163 Swine 0.315 0.290 0.020 0.050 0.120 0.045 0.015 0.000 0.145
Average Probability for Specified Distance Travelled To/From a Livestock Premise
(Distance in Meters)
 
We continue to use Bates et al. (2001) as a basis to develop the parameters 
for indirect contact movements.  We calculate monthly indirect contact movement rates 
by subtracting the employee and friend columns from the total mean number of monthly 
indirect contacts shown in the authors’ data, in order to model only higher risk, indirect 
contact.  We assume employees and friends are lower risk due to their limited exposure to 
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animals on other livestock premises on a single day; however, this may not be true given 
the number of farm employees who may have more than one job or keep livestock at 
home.  We then divide the monthly rates by 30 to determine the daily rates and multiply 
this daily rate by a probability that the indirect contact moves to another susceptible 
premises.  Finally, we combine similar probabilities for efficiency’s sake within the ISP 
(see Table 9).  We then estimate the probabilities for different movement distances for 
indirect contacts from another table by the authors (see Table 10).  The probabilities of 


































Table 9.   Indirect Contact Rates.  Green highlighted columns show the data or calculations 
we add to the corresponding table in Bates et al. (2001).  We consider the numeric 
premises “Type Codes” from our data to be equivalent to the “Facility Types” 
from Bates et al. (2001).  We calculate the Average Daily Movement Rate by 
multiplying the average daily indirect contact rate by the probability of a 
movement given an indirect contact.  We then average similar movement rates in 
order to increase the efficiency of running the model in ISP.  The second table 
below shows how these combinations were modeled in the ISP. 
 
















24,34,114,214,314 Backyard 4.2 18.2 26.1 15.9 36.3 3.7 0.1233 0.0123
310 Goat 39.9 3.0 50.6 0.0 137.2 7.7 0.2567 0.0257
211213 Sheep 8.1 14.4 30.5 16.4 44.6 8.0 0.2667 0.0267
Beef
51,61 < 250 9.0 9.3 22.1 13.7 30.5 3.8 0.1267 0.0127
53,63 >= 250 30.0 6.2 46.0 28.0 64.0 9.8 0.3267 0.0327
Dairy
31,32 < 1000 89.4 16.5 234.3 220.8 247.8 128.4 4.2800 0.4280
none 1000 - 1999 213.3 13.0 418.6 401.7 435.5 192.3 6.4100 0.6410
33 >= 2000 439.8 17.9 743.2 716.3 770.1 285.5 9.5167 0.9517
Calf/heifer
41 < 250 22.5 3.8 27.8 15.5 40.1 1.5 0.0500 0.0050
43,73 >= 250 463.2 17.0 609.4 128.3 1090.5 129.2 4.3067 0.4307
Swine
121,131,151,161 < 2000 76.2 9.4 97.9 36.0 159.8 12.3 0.4100 0.0410










41 Mvmt 14 0.0050
24, 34, 114, 214, 314, 
310, 211, 213, 51, 61, 
53, 63, 121, 131, 151, 
161 Mvmt 15 0.0252
153,163 Mvmt 16 0.1853
31,32,43,73 Mvmt 17 0.4294
33 Mvmt 18 0.9517
Indirect Contact Movement Rates
 
Table 10.   Movement Distance Probabilities used to model indirect contacts.  We estimate 
the probabilities for each of the specified distances from the corresponding table 
in Bates et al. (2001). 
Contact Type 9,000      19,000    29,000    39,000    49,000    59,000   
AI Tech 0.627 0.263 0.042 0.059 0.000 0.009
Hoof trimmer 0.237 0.395 0.263 0.053 0.026 0.026
Vet 0.456 0.327 0.105 0.053 0.007 0.052
Avg. of Distance Travelled by 
Contact Type 0.440 0.328 0.137 0.055 0.011 0.029




We model the distribution of movements between farms and markets with 
a Poisson distribution with , which equates to a movement from the farm to 
market about once every 10 days (i.e., 1 day divided by the rate of 0.1 per day).  The 
probabilities for different movement distances are estimated from the graphs in Bates et 
al. (2001) and are shown in Table 11.  The probability of transmission given a contact at 
a market is a constant 80% for our initial plausibility model. 
Table 11.   Movement Distance Probabilities used to model farm to and from market 
movements.  We estimate these probabilities for each of the specified distances 
from the corresponding graphs in Bates et al. (2001). 
Movement Type 19,000 39,000 59,000 79,000 99,000 119,000 139000 159,000 179,000 
From Seller to Sales Yard 0.546 0.216 0.167 0.018 0.005 0.014 0.004 0.006 0.024
To Buyer from Sales Yard 0.383 0.202 0.119 0.061 0.013 0.069 0.04 0.021 0.092
Probability for Specified Distance Travelled Between a Premise and Sales Yard
(Distance in Meters)
 
b. Local Spread 
ISP uses a spread mechanism called Local Spread to model short distance 
aerosol spread and spread between premises that cannot be specifically attributed to 
direct or indirect contact (Sanson, Stevenson, Mackereth, & Moles-Benfell, 2006b).  
“Through the fence” contact, or mechanical carriage of the virus by small domestic or 
wild animals, is an example of what Local Spread attempts to model.  Sanson et al. 
(2006b, p. 3) writes that, “2160 out of the 2365 (91%) of the IPs in the U.K. 1967 – 1968 
FMD epidemic were attributed to local spread, illustrating the perceived importance of 
this mechanism.”  We use Sanson, Stevenson, & Moles-Benfell (2006a) as our guide to 
setting the local spread initial settings, but increase the duration of the local spread from 
the four days in their research to five days.  We also increased the probabilities of spread 
at each distance band in order to increase the spread of the disease after our initial testing 
showed significantly slower spread than some comparable models used in California.  
We show the settings used in the development of the model in Table 12. 
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Table 12.   Probability of local spread of the virus at distance bands of 0–1 km, 1–2 km, and 
2–3 km from the infected premises.  We allow this spread to begin one day prior 
to and four days after clinical signs for the disease are evident on the premises. 
Days After 
Clinical Signs 1,000      2,000      3,000      
-1 0.013 0.003 0.001
0 0.039 0.009 0.003
1 0.052 0.012 0.004
2 0.052 0.012 0.004
3 0.052 0.012 0.004
4 0.052 0.012 0.004
Local Spread Distance (m)
 
ISP also has parameters within the Local Spread section for the relative 
susceptibility of different species to local spread.  Donaldson et al. (2001) found that 
cattle are the most susceptible to the aerosol spread of the disease, followed by sheep and 
swine.  We assume that goats and sheep are similar in their susceptibility and adjust the 
authors’ findings slightly to account for the larger average cattle herd size in California.  
We set these parameters as guided by Sanson et al. (2006a) for cattle, swine, and sheep 
and goats to 1, 0.01, and 0.05, respectively, for our plausibility models. 
c. Infectivity 
This section within ISP includes a probability distribution describing the 
time between an animal’s infection and when that animal starts to show clinical signs of 
infection.  This is also known as the incubation period.  From studying the 2001 U.K. 
FMD outbreak, Sanson et al. (2006b) determined that a good representation of the 
incubation period is given by the cumulative distribution shown in Figure 9, which we 
use in our plausibility model. 
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Figure 9.   Cumulative distribution describing probabilities associated with the time 
between animal infection and the onset of clinical signs of the disease 
(Sanson, 2006b).  All species use the same distribution. 
The other parameter we used in the Infectivity section describes the 
variation of herd infectiousness over time.  This parameter is multiplied by the 
probability of transmission parameters in the other sections to specify an overall 
probability of transmission.  Sanson et al. (2006b) estimated this parameter by utilizing a 
Delphi conference of FMD experts.  The participants at this conference determined that 
this parameter could be represented by a linear function decreasing from the 16th day 
after herd infection to the 33rd day after herd infection at a rate of 0.059. 
4. Development of the Disease-Spread Control Parameters 
Similar to Section 3, we wish to first check that our controlled spread model is 
plausible, so we initially set it up with mean or most likely parameter settings and test it 
to ensure that the disease control parameters are having an effect on the spread of the 
disease.  ISP contains eight sections that model the control measures that may be 
undertaken to combat an outbreak of FMD.  We do not model a statewide movement 
standstill, since this response is not specifically included in the CDFA FMD response 
plans (CDFA, 2006).  The seven sections we use are listed below and described in the 
following paragraphs. 
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 Zones:  apply to premises based on its modeling state and proximity to 
explicit boundaries or other premises 
 Surveillance:  models the detection of an infected premises 
 Resources:  applies constraints to the amount of depopulation or 
vaccination controls 
 Depopulation:  describes the depopulation strategy used by the model 
 Vaccination:  describes the vaccination strategy used by the model 
 Tracing:  models the detection of movements of the disease on or off a 
premise 
 Movement Restrictions:  describes how different movement types are 
restricted upon the first detection of an infected premise during the 
simulation 
a. Zones 
Similar to how ISP applies different modeling states to specific premises 
during the course of a simulation, ISP applies “Zones” to specific premises based on their 
geographic location.  A user can define these zones explicitly using coordinate polygons 
or radially around a specific premise, in a specific modeling state.  The user may also 
specify specific start and stop times for these zones, or have them triggered by a premise 
being assigned a specific modeling state.  For our model, we use two explicit zones and 
three radial zones and describe them below: 
 ZoneCalifornia:  Explicit zone used to describe the boundaries of the 
modeling area, which is the state of California.  We start this zone at the 
simulation start and keep it active for the entire simulation.  This zone 
contains all premises in our dataset. 
 Zone_ControlArea:  Radial zone used to represent the Control Area and to 
define an area within a certain distance from a detected premise.  If a 
premise is located in this zone, ISP will assign a model state of 
in_control_area and apply certain movement restrictions and surveillance 
methods to that premise as described below.  Control area zones will be 
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active for the entire length of the simulation, beginning when the first 
premises are detected with the disease.  The outside radius used for initial 
plausibility testing will be 10 km, which is the minimum radius 
recommended by the USDA for a control area (USDA, 2011). 
 Zone_Vaccinate:  Radial zone used to represent a Vaccination zone and to 
define an area within a certain distance from a detected premise.  If a 
premise is located in this zone, ISP will assign a model state of 
in_vacc_zone and the premise will be added to a vaccination premises list, 
which will be described in the Vaccination paragraph below.  Vaccination 
zones will be active for the entire length of the simulation, beginning 
when the first premises are detected with the disease.  The USDA does not 
have a recommended radius for a vaccination zone, so we use 10 km as 
the outside radius for initial plausibility testing of the model. 
 Zone_Surv:  Radial zone used to represent the Surveillance Zone and to 
define an area within a certain distance from a detected premise.  For 
premises located in this zone, ISP will assign a model state of 
in_surv_zone unless those premises are already in a control area.  ISP will 
then apply certain movement restrictions and surveillance methods to 
those premises as described below.  Surveillance zones will be active for 
the entire length of the simulation beginning when the first premises are 
detected with the disease.  The outside radius used for initial plausibility 
testing will be 25 km, which is 5 km larger than the minimum radius 
recommended by the USDA for a control area (USDA, 2011). 
 Zone_likeDairy:  Explicit zone with the same boundaries as 
ZoneCalifornia above, but used to represent premises with a likeDairy 
modeling state.  If premises are located in this zone, ISP applies certain 
movement restrictions and surveillance methods to those premises as 




ISP models the detection of infected premises using the Surveillance 
section of the control file.  When a premises changes from an infected state to a detected 
state, authorities would assumedly impose some types of control measures to limit the 
disease spread.  ISP uses two parameters to determine the likelihood of detection.  The 
proportion of premises that participate in a surveillance type is called the selection 
probability, whereas the probability of an infected premise being detected, given that it is 
visited by a surveillance team, is called the detection probability.  The detection 
probability can also be specified for each species modeled as desired by the user.  We use 
Sanson et al. (2006b) and Hullinger (2012) as guides to these probabilities for the 
plausibility test of our model.  Additionally, ISP models three rates within each type of 
surveillance: 
 Visit delay, which is the rate at which the surveillance is delayed to a 
premise given it is selected for certain surveillance type;  
 Visit frequency, which is the rate between visits while the premise is still 
on a surveillance list; and 
 Delay to detection, which is the amount of time that passes between when 
a successful visit occurred on an infected premise and when that premise 
will be given the detected model state. 






























































Selection Zone ZoneCalifornia ZoneCalifornia likeDairy likeDairy Zone_Control
Area
Zone_Surv ZoneCalifornia
Selection Probability 0.65 0.85 0.999 0.999 0.99 0.9 0.75
Visit Delay - Poisson 6 4.5 1.75 1.25 2.75 3.5 4
Visit Frequency - Poisson 6.5 4.5 1.75 1.25 4 4.5 4
Delay To Detection - Poisson 4.5 3 3 1.75 1.25 1.5 3
Detection Relative To Clinical Signs Clinical Signs Clinical Signs Clinical Signs Clinical Signs Clinical Signs Clinical Signs
Detection Probability - Constant 0.495 0.895 0.745 0.895 0.895 0.895 0.895
Detection Probability (sheep) - 




ISP uses the Resources section in the control file to apply constraints to 
the control strategies specified by the user.  If ISP needs to apply control strategies to a 
premise based on its current model state, that premise is added to a resource list.  Then, 
ISP will be allowed to apply the required strategy to premises on the list at the rate 
specified within the resource section.  ISP allows these strategies to vary over time, and 
we use a 10-day “ramp up” period for both vaccination and depopulation control 
strategies.  During the first to the ninth day after a premise has been added to a resource 
list, we limit the control strategy to only 10% of the total amount of resources available 
during the rest of the simulation.  For example, in our plausibility testing, we use a 
constraint that states that 20,000 animals can be vaccinated or depopulated per day at full 
utilization.  So, on days 1 through 9, only 2,000 animals can be vaccinated or 
depopulated per day.  The full utilization rate assumes that California has an equivalent 
amount of resources to depopulate as the U.K. did in 2001. 
d. Depopulation 
In the next section of the control file, we define our depopulation strategy, 
which is to only depopulate premises that have had the disease detected on them.  ISP 
allows alternative preemptive depopulation in zones, usually in a radius around detected 
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premises, but we chose not to model this control measure because of our understanding 
of the current views in California to such a practice (Hullinger, 2012).  The parameter 
settings we use are to activate a depopulation action upon ISP assigning a premise to the 
modeling state of “detected” and the action will only be applied to that particular 
premise.  We will constrain this action using the depopulation resource described above. 
e. Vaccination 
Our vaccination strategy for the plausibility test is to vaccinate likeDairy 
premises that are assigned to the vaccination zone.  Vaccinations are completed from the 
outside to the inside of a radial vaccination zone and are constrained by the resources 
described in the “Resources” paragraph above.  Once a premise is vaccinated, its 
probability of infection by another premise is reduced, based on a user-defined lookup 
table.  This table defines the proportion of animals on the premise that are not immune to 
infection at a given point in time.  We use conservative estimates of this proportion, 
which we derived from Doel et al. (1994).  The authors examined the rate of development 
of immunity in several FMD susceptible species, including cattle, and found that all of 
the cattle they tested were immune four days after vaccination.  However, they also cite 
other studies that indicated that this result may be optimistic.  Our table states that 10% of 
the animals on the premises are not immune after four days and 0.5% are not immune 
after 15 days.  The effect of this proportion is that ISP multiplies the probability of 
transmission by this proportion to determine a new overall probability of transmission.  
For example, if a certain infected premise attempted to spread the disease to other 
premises that were in their fifth day after vaccination, ISP would multiply the calculated 
probability of transmission (e.g., 0.5) by 0.1, the number in the table, to reach an overall 
probability of transmission of 0.05. 
f. Tracing 
This is the attempt to find contacts that have been made onto or off of a 
particular detected premise.  ISP can model both types of tracing, backward and forward.  
Backward tracing involves interviewing the staff of a certain detected premise to 
determine what direct and indirect contacts were possible between the start of the 
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outbreak and the presumed date of the premise’s infection, which is based on the 
observation of the clinical signs of the disease.  The goal of backward tracing is to 
determine what premises could have infected the detected premise and then to apply 
certain controls or surveillance to the possibly infected premise.  In contrast, the goal of 
forward tracing is to determine what other premises that the detected premises could have 
infected since the presumed date of infection.  This is accomplished in the same manner 
as backward tracing, by personal interview of the staff of the detected premise. 
The ISP user can define tracing parameters for forward and backward 
tracing for each individual movement type or define them globally for all movement 
types.  We apply the settings globally within our model.  The tracing parameters available 
include:  when the tracing action will begin, the probability that a movement is forgotten, 
and the rate at which tracing interviews are accomplished.  We use all of these parameters 
as described below: 
 Time period to start tracing:  We begin tracing operations two days after 
the first detection and continue them through the entire simulation. 
 Probability the movement is forgotten:  We use a setting of 42.5% of 
movements will be forgotten. 
 Tracing delay:  We use a Poisson distribution with a mean rate of delay of 
3.75 for this setting.  This equates to having to an average time until 
tracing is complete of almost four days. 
g. Movement Restrictions 
ISP reduces the rate for each movement type after the first infected 
premise is detected using the movement restriction parameters within the control file.  
For our model, we define three movement restrictions.  For all movement types with a 
source or destination premise in a control area, the probability that the movement will not 
occur is set to 92%.  For all movement types with a source or destination premise in a 
surveillance zone, the probability that the movement will not occur is set to 84.5%.  We 
added an additional movement restriction on all to or from market movement within 
California in order to test that control strategy.  This restriction is turned on or off by 
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setting the probability that the movement will not occur to either 0% or 99%, depending 
on the strategy used.  For our plausibility testing, this probability was set to 0%, meaning 
that only markets in a control area or surveillance zone are affected by a movement 
restriction. 
5. Development of Starting Scenarios 
As mentioned earlier, the majority of the studies conducted on the spread of FMD 
in California have been limited to the Central Valley of the state, where the majority of 
the large livestock premises are located.  We wish to broaden that scope by starting 
outbreaks of the disease randomly chosen from all premises in California if they meet 
certain conditions.  The conditions we choose are based on the suspected sources of FMD 
outbreaks of modern livestock countries as well as expert opinion (Hullinger, 2012 & 
Stevenson, 2012).  We show the scenarios we model in Table 14. 
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Table 14.   Description, methodology, and rationale behind the scenarios we model. 
 
Scenario Description Methodology Rationale
Southern Border
Randomly infect five cattle facilities 
along the southern border of California 
to represent spread from a Mexican 
FMD outbreak.
If [(Latitude <= 33 or Longitude >= -
115) And number of Cattle on Farm > 
10], then eligible for selection.  
Randomly selected 5 initially infected 
premise from eligible list.
Bulgaria, 2011.  Index case was near the 
Turkish border and a feral pig was 
antemordem diagnosed with FMD.  
Turkey had an FMD outbreak occuring 
at the time.
Market Randomly infect one market to represent spread from direct or indirect contact.
If Type = 511 OR 512, then eligible for 
selection.  Randomly select 1 to be 
initially infected premise.
Markets are known to be supernodes in 
the spread of FMD.  The source of 
infection to the market could have been 
a person involved in the livestock 
industry who had recently returned from 
travel to a country with a current FMD 
outbreak.
San Francisco Port
Randomly infect one swine facility near 
San Francisco to represent illegal import 
of feed for swine (as in UK outbreak of 
2001).
If [(37.25 < Latitude <= 38.25 And 
Longitude < -121.75) And number of 
Swine on Farm > 10], then eligible for 
selection.  Randomly selected 1 initially 
infected premise from the eligible list.
LA Port
Randomly infect one swine facility near 
Los Angeles to represent illegal import 
of feed for swine (as in UK outbreak of 
2001).
If [(33.2 < Latitude <= 34.2 And 
Longitude < -117) And number of Swine 
on Farm > 10], then eligible for 
selection.  Randomly selected 1 initially 
infected premise from the eligible list.
High Animal Density
Randomly infect one cattle facility in an 
area in the 90th percentile or higher of 
animal-dense locations.
If [(Number of Animals within 10k >  
47779 (90th Percentile)) And (Latitude 
> 34) And number of Cattle on Farm > 
10)], then eligible for selection.  
Randomly selected 1 initially infected 
premise from the eligible list.
Conducted in order to compare our 
model to other models of FMD in 
California, most of which are in high 
animal dense areas.  Also, this is the 
most likely area to be infected by an 
terrorist organization.
Low Animal Density
Randomly infect one cattle facility in an 
area in the 10th percentile or lower of 
animal-dense locations.
If [(Number of Animals within 10k <  
647 (10th Percentile)) And (Latitude > 
34) And number of Cattle on Farm > 
10)], then eligible for selection.  
Randomly selected 1 initially infected 
premise from the eligible list.
Conducted to contrast with the High 
Animal Density Scenario.
High Premise Density
Randomly infect one cattle facility in an 
area in the 90th percentile or higher of 
premise-dense locations.
If [(Number of Farms within 10k >  185 
(90th Percentile)) And (Latitude > 34) 
And number of Cattle on Farm > 10)], 
then eligible for selection.  Randomly 
selected 1 initially infected premise from 
the eligible list.
Conducted in order to determine how 
ISP reacts to high premise dense areas in 
comparison with high animal dense 
areas.  This may also indicate how the 
disease could spread through Northern 
California, which is a geographic area 
which has not been studied as much as 
other areas of the state.
Low Premise Density
Randomly infect one cattle facility in an 
area in the 10th percentile or lower of 
premise-dense locations.
If [(Number of Farms within 10k <  12 
(10th Percentile)) And (Latitude > 34) 
And number of Cattle on Farm > 10)], 
then eligible for selection.  Randomly 
selected 1 initially infected premise from 
the eligible list.
Conducted to contrast with the High 
Premise Density Scenario.
Swine infected by feeding on illegally 
imported meat were the probable sources 
of infection in Taiwan (1997), the UK 
(2001), and South Korea (2011)
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III. PLAUSIBILITY TESTING OF INITIAL DISEASE-SPREAD 
MODELS 
In this chapter, we describe and compare the disease-spread dynamics of the 
Uncontrolled and Controlled Spread Models described in Chapter II.  Testing model 
plausibility is difficult because no outbreaks of FMD have been observed in California 
since 1929, and the livestock industry has changed considerably since then.  We therefore 
have two options to use in order to attempt to categorize our simulation model as 
plausible or not. 
 First, we could attempt to study recent outbreaks in countries whose 
livestock industry is similar to ours and parameterize our model similar to 
how those outbreaks actually behaved.  This method, however, ignores 
important differences between California and those countries in animal 
husbandry methods, animal/premises densities, and intensity of operations. 
 Second, we could consult a number of subject matter experts (SME) to try 
to discern how to parameterize the model based on their opinions as 
Sanson et al. (2006b) did when parameterizing ISP for New Zealand.  This 
method is also difficult because SMEs do not always agree, it may not be 
clear how to weight differing opinions, and it is time consuming to gather 
and compile the opinions. 
Of these two, the SME option may be a better course.  Because of time 
availability, however, we choose to compare our simulation model to another country’s 
outbreak.  Ultimately, this plausibility test does not have much impact on our final results 
because we use a design of experiment to explore a wide variety of different parameter 
combinations in order to see which are most important in the model.  The plausibility 
testing that we conduct here is merely done to ensure that the model is producing 
reasonable results and should not be construed as being predictive of an actual outbreak 
of FMD in California. 
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A. THE UNCONTROLLED SPREAD MODEL 
In order to determine whether the base models we developed are plausible, we 
begin by comparing the uncontrolled spread model to the “silent spread” of the disease—
the spread of the disease prior to infected premises being detected—from a previous 
outbreak in a modern livestock country.  Gibbens et al. (2002) estimated that during the 
U.K. outbreak in 2001, at least 57 premises were already infected with FMD when the 
first detected case was disclosed.  Using the starting scenarios described in Section 5, we 
compare how many premises were infected on the 21st day of our model to the author’s 
estimated number of premises in order to determine our model’s plausibility.  Even 
though some of the starting scenarios had significantly larger outbreaks, we believe that 
the model we developed is plausible because the average across all scenarios tested was 
similar to the U.K. outbreak, and two of our scenarios were within 11 premises of the 
U.K. number.  The results of this comparison are shown in Table 15. 
Table 15.   Six out of seven scenarios we examined that are similar to the 2001 U.K. FMD 
outbreak have an average outbreak size after 21 days that are in the same order of 
magnitude as the U.K. outbreak, which had an estimated 57 infectious premises 
on the 21st day of the outbreak (Gibbens et al., 2002).  We conclude from this 
comparison, that our model is a plausible model of uncontrolled spread within 
California. 
Number of Infected Premises by Scenario 
(100 Iterations) 
Scenario Mean Std Dev Q.25 Q.75 
Low Animal Density 10.40 20.45 1.00 8.00 
Border 60.47 30.00 38.25 77.75 
Market Start 14.92 57.67 1.00 5.75 
LA Port 12.34 10.50 5.25 15.75 
SF Port 537.38 143.43 450.25 572.75 
High Premise Density 68.59 83.02 16.00 95.00 
Low Premise Density 11.18 66.12 1.00 1.00 




We also looked at which spread mechanisms were causing the disease spread to 
see if those mechanisms were similar to the literature.  The mechanisms that were 
causing the most spread were MovementType12, which is market movement; 
MovementType18, which is indirect contact from large dairy premises; and local spread 
(see Figure 10).  Even though the local spread effects may be higher than expected when 
compared to the indirect contact and market movement, especially when considering that 
many forms of indirect contact are catagorized as local spread within actual outbreak 
statistics, we feel these spread mechanisms are similar in their impacts on the outbreak to 
those observed in the literature and are therefore plausible for our purposes. 
 
Figure 10.   The distribution of disease-spread mechanisms during plausibility testing 
of the Uncontrolled Spread Model.  The spread mechanisms with the 
highest probability of causing disease spread are MovementType12, which 
is market movement; MovementType15, which is indirect contact at many 
types of premises; and local spread.  The x-axis shows the probability that 
the spread mechanism shown along the y-axis causes disease spread.  The 
counts to the right of each bar show how many times the spread 
mechanism caused the disease spread over the 100 iterations that the 
simulation was run.  See Appendix A for the details of each spread type. 
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B. THE CONTROLLED SPREAD MODEL 
Determining the plausibility of the controlled spread model is more difficult than 
the uncontrolled model, since the controls used are unique to what we believe are “most 
likely” control scenarios for the United States and, as such, are not comparable to 
outbreaks in other countries.  In order to determine plausibility, we simply observe how 
the uncontrolled spread model is affected by the same set of controls over all starting 
scenarios to ensure that the outputs are reasonable.  We found that the control parameter 
settings affected the uncontrolled spread model predictably for all scenarios.  An example 
showing the spread comparison between models, using the High Premises Density 
scenario, is shown in Figure 11, and the distribution of spread mechanisms is shown in 
Figure 12. 
 
Figure 11.   Comparison of Plausibility Models:  Uncontrolled Spread vs. Controlled 
Spread.  By observing the infected premises curve for both the 
uncontrolled and the controlled spread on a log scale, we can see the effect 
of detecting an infected premise.  Here, the minimum detection time over 
100 simulation iterations was two days, but the effect of the detection 
begins on Day 4, based on the length of time needed to apply controls. 
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Figure 12.   The distribution of disease-spread mechanisms during plausibility testing 
of the Controlled Spread Model.  The spread mechanisms with the highest 
probability of causing disease spread are local spread and 
MovementType12, which is market movement.  Notice that Epidemic 
History, which is merely the initially infected premises, contains almost 
20% of the spread and how the counts along each bar are significantly 
reduced from Figure 10, which indicates that the controls are having an 
effect on the disease spread. 
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IV. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Because intentionally introducing the virus into a large livestock population is not 
a viable method for scientific inquiry, FMD is generally studied in one of three ways: 
 Live virus infection and study of a limited quantity of susceptible animals 
to determine virus and vaccine characteristics; 
 Statistical studies of past or current outbreaks to study how diseases have 
spread through populations, given the characteristics of the study area and 
virus type/subtype; and 
 Simulation modeling to attempt to predict the characteristics of future 
outbreaks. 
We intend to use the research completed by others in the first two ways to inform 
our research of the third way—simulation modeling.  We do this by designing an 
efficient experimental design that varies the parameters of the simulation in order to find 
response strategies that are robust to those variations.  The next section explains how this 
was done by giving an overview of why we use an experimental design in general, and 
then how we implemented our design specifically. 
A. WHY WE USE AN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
In Chapter II, Section A, we described some of the objectives of simulation 
modeling of a disease.  There exists significant uncertainty in the way that a disease 
spreads through a population; the manner in which the first premises are infected; and 
what policies, technologies, and logistical constraints we may have in our attempts to 
control the disease.  In order to study how the disease may spread and to find control 
measures that are robust to these uncertainties, we run the simulation many times using a 
variety of simulation parameter settings, initial infection scenarios, and control strategies.  
With 73 factors considered in our model, conducting a full-factorial design—one that 
tries every combination of factors—is computationally intractable.  Even by making 
every factor binary, having only a high and low setting, it would require 273 simulation  
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runs.  Instead, we conduct this experiment in an intelligent way in order to maximize our 
insights and conclusions.  So, we use an efficient experimental design.  As Sanchez 
(2008, p. 73) states, 
…for those interested in exploring the I/O (Input/Output) behavior of their 
simulation model, efficient experimental design has a much higher payoff 
at a much lower cost.  A well-designed experiment allows the analyst to 
examine many more factors than would otherwise be possible, while 
providing insights that cannot be gleaned from trial-and-error approaches 
or by sampling factors one at a time. 
An experimental design is a matrix in which every row represents one simulation 
run, called a design point, and every column represents a certain parameter, called a 
factor.  In our case, the factors include the different ways the disease could behave, the 
environment in which the disease starts and spreads, and the controls we impose to stop 
that spread.  Examples of the factors we look at in the experimental design include:  the 
rate at which animals start to show clinical signs of FMD, the probability of an animal 
being moved some distance and spreading the disease, and how often animals are 
observed for signs of the disease.  Our goal is to then test the factors at many different 
settings, called levels, in an efficient way that allows us to see the factor levels’ effects on 
the spread of the disease without undue strain on our computational resources. 
Many experimental designs for simulations exist in the literature and several have 
been designed at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Simulation Experiments and Efficient 
Design (SEED) Center.  Most of these designs are based on nearly orthogonal Latin 
hypercube (NOLH) designs and may be crossed with a traditional factorial design to 
make a mixed design (Cioppa & Lucas, 2007).  NOLH designs have good qualities in 
that they are “space-filling” and have minimal pairwise correlations between factors.  The 
former is beneficial because it explores the entire sample space and the latter because it 
ensures that the metamodel developed from the design will indicate factor coefficients 
very similar to the true, unknown, coefficients—even in the presence or absence of other 
more significant factors.  In other words, even if the factors we include in our experiment 
are not the most significant factors impacting the simulation output, the metamodel is still  
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informative because it shows the correct main effects of included factors.  It cannot, 
however, show the interactions of the included factors with the factors we choose not  
to include. 
B. OUR EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION 
Because of the complexity of ISP and its large number of inputs, attempting to 
analyze the ways in which these inputs affect the output of the simulation is a significant 
endeavor.  We use a Nearly Orthogonal and Balanced design for our experiment (Vieira, 
2012a).  From ISP, we choose 70 continuous and 2 discrete two-level parameters to vary.  
We then cross this design with the eight starting scenarios to develop 4,096 unique design 
points.  We show a small sample of the design in Figure 13 and a description of each 
factor in Appendix A.  The design has a maximum pairwise correlation of less than 4%.  
Five percent is the maximum to still be considered a nearly orthogonal design.  For each 
design point, we generate an ISP control file and an epidemic history file with randomly 
chosen, initially infected premises based on the constraints of the modeled starting 
scenario.  Each control file is used to simulate 100 iterations, for a total of 409,600 
individual simulations.  The simulations were run on the SEED Center’s cluster of 60 
computers and took approximately seven days to complete. 
 
Figure 13.   Screenshot from the experimental design with the first five design points 
of the first three starting scenarios.  The six factors shown are varied in a 
nearly orthogonal and balanced way between the low and high levels 
shown in the first two rows of the spreadsheet. 
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C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE) 
There are many ways to measure how effective the control policies implemented 
during an outbreak are in terms of their impact on the livestock industry and the animals 
on the premises.  Depending on the priorities and costs involved with a particular 
outbreak, some authorities will be most concerned with the number of animals or 
premises infected, while others will care more about how many of either are vaccinated, 
depopulated, or put under some type of movement restriction.  For our analysis, we focus 
on those measures of effectiveness (MOEs) we feel have the most impact on the livestock 
industry and the state of California: 
 Detection Time:  the amount of time between the start of the simulation 
and when the first infected premises are detected. 
 Infected:  the number of cattle or premises infected.  We include cattle in 
this MOE because it is the animal that has the most impact on the 
economy in California. 
 Affected by Movement Restrictions:  the number of cattle or premises 
affected by movement restrictions, either in the control area or 
surveillance zone.  We include this because movement restrictions pose an 
economic burden on premises in the control area.  We view this MOE as 
as a surrogate to explicitly modeling the economic impact, which would 
require significantly more research and detail in the model to be accurate. 
 Weighted Average of Infected and Affected:  Sixty percent of the 
weight was given to Infected and 40% to Affected, signifying that infected 
premises are more detrimental to the study area than affected premises.  
This MOE allows us to combine the previous MOE in order to see if 
controls can be effective against both simultaneously. 
 Frequency of Max Infected Premises:  the number out of 100 simulation 
iterations reaching the maximum infected premises limit.  This MOE helps 
us determine the potential for a large outbreak. 
We considered four ways of calculating each MOE, with the exception of the 
Frequency of Max Infected Premises, which is measured by a simple count.  The first 
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way is the mean over all simulation iterations.  This is the simplest and most easily 
explainable method to describe the data; however, it does not account for any variability 
displayed within the simulation and may oversimplify the characteristics of the outbreak.  
Some modelers prefer using the median instead of the mean because the distributions of 
the output variables in most FMD models are highly skewed.  The median is a better 
predictor of what would be most often seen of the MOE.  We prefer the mean, however, 
because our purpose is to limit “worst-case” outbreaks, which we believe are not modeled 
as well by the median.  The second way is the upper quartile mean.  This statistic is 
calculated by taking the mean of the upper quartile of the simulation results and is a more 
pessimistic view of the data than the mean, since it only includes the largest 25% of the 
outbreaks represented by a design point.  It provides a better measure to compare control 
strategies aimed at limiting large outbreaks while not being overly influenced by outliers.  
Like the mean, it does not expressly measure the variability of the output, though.  The 
final way we consider is to calculate the MOE by using a quadratic loss function, which 
is the sum of the mean squared and standard deviation squared; a standard measure in 
simulation analysis (Sanchez, 2000). 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we describe the results of our simulation model and the analysis of 
the data.  We leave our interpretations and conclusions from each result for Chapter VI.  
Primarily, we use JMP Pro 9.0 (JMP, 2012) as the statistical software package to conduct 
our analysis.  When describing the factors within our model, we use the term “decision 
factor” with factors that are controlled by livestock producers, livestock-related 
individuals or companies, or state or federal authorities before or during an FMD 
outbreak.  Examples include the size of a control area or a particular vaccination strategy.  
Alternatively, we use the term “noise factor” with factors that are not controlled or only 
controlled at a significant cost, such as the average time until clinical signs are apparent 
or the number of animal movements that originate at small dairy premises prior to the 
detection of an outbreak.  We do not describe each factor modeled in detail in this 
chapter.  Instead, we provide these detailed descriptions in Appendix A.  We divide the 
chapter into six sections: 
 Correlation:  a description of how the factors correlate with the MOEs 
and how the MOEs correlate with each other. 
 Models used to explore simulation output:  descriptions of the modeling 
techniques we use to explore the simulation output. 
 Impact of starting scenarios:  a description of how the starting scenarios 
impacted the simulation results. 
 Time until the first detection of infected premises:  a description of the 
detection time results and the models we use to determine its contributing 
factors. 
 Mean number of infected premises:  a description of the number of 
infected premises results and the models we use to determine this MOE’s 
contributing factors. 
 Model to explore the potential for a large outbreak:  a description of 
the model we develop to address the impact of the maximum number of 
infected premises parameter within our simulation. 
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A. CORRELATION 
Correlation is an indicator of the linearity in the relationship between two factors.  
(Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2006).  It is a number between –1 and 1, with negative 
numbers indicating that as one factor grows, the other decreases.  It should not be used to 
predict the value of one factor given another factor, but can be valuable as a first step 
towards looking for relationships between two factors and getting an idea of how well 
predictive models may perform.  We produce a correlation matrix in order to check the 
pairwise correlations between all of the factors and MOEs within our model and provide 
our analysis in the next three sections. 
1. Factor and MOE Correlation 
Correlations between the factors and MOEs are generally between –0.25 and 0.25, 
with only two exceptions.  The first is the Local Spread Multiplier, which is a noise 
factor.  This is a multiplier applied to the distance bands of the local spread parameter 
within ISP (see Table 12).  For example, the distance bands used in the base model for 
Local Spread are 1,000 m, 2,000 m, and 3,000 m.  The Local Spread Multiplier varies 
these bands through multiplication.  Thus, if a Local Spread Multiplier of 1.5 was applied 
to a specific design point, then the resulting distance bands would be 1,500 m, 3,000 m, 
and 4,500 m.  The probability of the disease spread to those distance bands would remain 
the same, however.  The Local Spread Multiplier was correlated at 0.25 or above to all 
MOEs except Average Detection Time and Robust Weighted Average of Infected Cattle.  
This indicates that as the Local Spread Multiplier increases, so would the MOE.  The 
second factor showing some correlation is the Delay To Detection of Dairy or Dairy-like 
Premises, which describes the amount of time between when a certain premises is 
inspected for disease and when the disease is actually detected.  This factor is positively 
correlated with the Average Detection Time at 0.53. 
2. Impact of Factor Correlations on Potential Models 
Since the correlations between both the noise and decision factors with the MOE 
are low, we suspect that there is significant nonlinearity within the simulation output (see  
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Figure 14), and that no simple linear or quadratic functions will represent the outbreaks 
with high confidence.  This is to be expected, however, within a complex system such as 
disease spread.  Keeling (2005, p. 1196) states,  
For the spread of FMD, existing biological and veterinary knowledge is 
still not sufficiently quantified to enable the creation of a complex model 
that can accurately encompass all the mechanisms of disease transmission 
both within and between farms, and more basic research is needed. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Average Number of Premises Infected vs. Several Noise and Decision 
Factors.  The relationship between the MOEs and each of the factors is not 
clearly linear and there exists a large amount of variation within the data. 
3. Between MOE Correlation 
Correlations between all MOE pairs, with the exception of Detection Time, are 
generally above 0.8.  This indicates that the MOEs are highly positively correlated.  We 
show a sample of the effect of a high correlation in the graph in Figure 15.  Because of 
the similarity between MOEs, for simplicity’s sake, we will generally discuss our 
simulation results using the mean of the MOEs. 
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Figure 15.   Graphs showing how similar various calculations of MOEs are when 
plotted against the same variables—here two depopulation resource 
factors.  The vertical axis describes several different MOEs.  The 
horizontal axis within each column describes a change in the 
“Resource1.TimePeriodStart2.FullUtilization,” which is the number of 
days until all depopulation resources are available.  Each column of graphs 
represents a bin for the “Resource1.PerTimePeriod,” which is the full 
number of resources available for depopulation.  The smoother lines in 
each column of graphs, where the MOE changes, but the factors vary 
similarly, are virtually identical.  This is the effect of having highly 
correlated MOE. 
B. MODELS USED TO EXPLORE SIMULATION OUTPUT 
We use two common techniques to model the output of our simulation:  multiple-




(CART).  Both of these will be impacted by low correlations between the factors and the 
MOEs, and by the suspected nonlinearity within the simulation.  Below are descriptions 
of the two techniques. 
1. Multiple Regression Analysis  
Multiple regression analysis seeks to explore the relationship between several 
factors, called regressors, and a response variable, which we call an MOE (Montgomery, 
Peck, & Vining, 2006).  It does this by attempting to approximate the behavior of the 
response variable with a linear equation incorporating the regressors.  By observing the 
coefficients of the linear equation, we are then able to identify which factors have the 
greatest impact on the response variable or MOE.  We evaluate the models using the 
adjusted R2, a common measure to compare how models are able to describe the data.  
This statistic is a score between 0 and 1 that measures how much variability is explained 
by the factors in the model, but penalizes for adding insignificant factors to the model 
(Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2006).  In order for the regression to be adequate, four 
assumptions about the residual errors between the actual response and the predicted 
response must be met.  They are:  the mean of the errors must equal zero, the errors must 
have constant variance, all errors are independent, and all errors are normally distributed.  
The most difficult of the assumptions for us to meet is the normality assumption because 
tests for normality are highly influenced by outliers, which are prevalent within our 
simulations.  We will test all of these assumptions for the models presented later in this 
section. 
2. Partition Trees  
Partition trees are graphical representations of a hierarchy of questions asked of 
the data to determine how they should be classified or grouped (Montgomery, Peck, & 
Vining, 2006).  The questions are displayed as an upside down tree, with the root at the 
top containing the entire dataset.  The data are then split sequentially in order to 
maximize the difference in the mean of continuous factors or the probability of 
categorical factors so that the nodes, or leaves, are as much alike as possible.  Many  
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algorithms exist to accomplish these splits.  JMP uses a log Worth calculation for 
categorical factors and a Sum of Squares (SS) calculation for continuous factors (SAS, 
2010). 
C. IMPACT OF STARTING SCENARIOS 
Since ISP is a spatial model, we expect that it will behave differently given 
different starting scenarios, and that some scenarios are more likely to produce long 
detection times or large outbreaks.  We tested these assumptions by conducting  
Tukey-Kramer HSD (honestly significant difference) comparison of means tests 
(Mendenhall & Sincich, 1984) on the Detection Time mean and the Infected Premises 
mean.  This test calculates a  single statistically significant critical difference (the HSD), 
in our case at a 95% confidence level, for the mean pairs and then groups the factor 
means in bins according to the computed critical difference.  The results show that there 
are significant differences in the behavior of the model, based on a starting scenario using 
both MOEs.  The Southeast Border scenario has a statistically significant lower mean 
detection time, while the High Animal Density scenario has a statistically significant 
higher mean number of infected premises.  These results are shown in Figures 16 and 17.  
Additionally, all multiple-regression models and partition trees explained in Sections D, 
E, and F are first run with the starting scenario allowed in the model.  In all cases, it is the 
most significant factor in the model.  We present the rest of our models without the 
contribution of the starting scenarios, however, in order to focus on which factors 
contribute most to the MOEs across all starting scenarios. 
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Figure 16.   Tukey-Kramer HSD comparison of means test for Detection Time.  The 
graph shows the respective detection times output for each starting 
scenario.  The green diamonds represent the mean detection time along 
with a 95% confidence interval.  Generally, if the diamonds do not 
overlap, then the means are different.  The statistical tests printed below 
the graph show which starting scenarios have statistically significant 
differences.  The first matrix of values is Tukey’s honestly significant 
difference (HSD) subtracted from the absolute difference between the 
means.  In this case, the HSD is 0.2217, which is the value along the 
diagonal.  Positive values show that the pairs of means are significantly 
different.  The table displayed at the bottom of the figure is a sorted list of 
the means.  The capital letters displayed in the middle of the table show 
which scenarios are within the HSD of another scenario.  Scenarios not 
connected by the same letter are significantly different. 
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Figure 17.   Tukey-Kramer honestly significant difference (HSD) comparison of 
means test for Infected Premises.  The graph shows the respective number 
of infected premises output for each starting scenario. 
D. TIME UNTIL THE FIRST DETECTION OF AN INFECTED PREMISES 
There is some debate within the literature about the importance of the length of 
time between when the first premises are infected and when the first premises are 
detected.  Carpenter et al. (2011) use simulation to vary the length of time between when 
a facility is infected and when it is detected to estimate the economic impact of the 
outbreak to the United States and California, specifically.  The authors find that the 
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shorter the time frame, the less expensive the outbreak.  McLaws & Ribble (2007) 
research the relationship between outbreak size and early detection during outbreaks 
between 1992 and 2003.  Given the authors compile their data from many countries with 
various ways of reporting, there is significant variability within the documented statistics.  
Their analysis of the statistics, however, leads them to conclude that there is no direct 
relationship between outbreak size and early detection.  In this section, we will describe 
the distribution of the Detection Time mean, the relationship between infection and 
detection in our model, and then discuss a multiple-regression model and a partition tree 
model that explore the most important factors determining the detection time from our 
simulation. 
1. Distribution of Detection Times 
We begin by analyzing the distribution of the mean detection times across all 
factors and starting scenarios (see Figure 18).  The mean is 5.8 days, with a standard 
deviation of 1.5 days, and the distribution is relatively normal in shape, although 
asymptotically bounded on the left at two days.  The maximum mean detection time is 
10.57 days. 
 
Figure 18.   Distribution of Detection Time means across all factors and scenarios 
2. Infection vs. Detection Results 
The assumption that the shorter the length of time between infection and 
detection, then the smaller the number of infected premises did not hold for our 
simulation, in general.  Instead, what we observe is that as the detection time increases, 
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the number of infected premises increases for a short amount of time and then decreases 
steadily (see Figure 19).  This observation is also evident across design points with high 
or low potential for being large (see Figures 20 and 21).  We discuss this perhaps 
counterintuitive result in Chapter VI. 
 
Figure 19.   Average number of infected premises vs. average detection time.  The 
smoother line shows the trend of the output, while the contours show the 
concentration of the data—the darker the area, the more data are located 
there.  Red data points are those iterations of the simulation for which the 
data point has the potential to be large (over 7,700 premises), while blue 
data points are from design points that do not have this potential.  Notice 
that as the average detection time increases, the number of infected 




Figure 20.   Average number of infected premises vs. average detection time for 
scenarios (design points) with the potential of a large outbreak.  Notice the 
similar behavior in this figure and Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21.   Average number of infected premises vs. average detection time for 
scenarios with low potential of a large outbreak. 
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3. Multiple-Regression Model 
We use a forward Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) stepwise technique to 
create the multiple-regression model.  This technique uses an algorithm to add significant 
factors to the model, while penalizing the addition of insignificant factors or those with 
insignificant coefficients and works well with large datasets (Posada & Buckley, 2004).  
We allow the algorithm to search through all noise and decision factor main effects and 
second order polynomials to develop a model.  The fitted model contains 14 terms that 
explain about 42% of the variability in the data and produces an adjusted R2 of 0.417 (see 
Figure 22). 
 
Figure 22.   Fitted model for Detect Time mean.  Adjusted R2 is 0.417.  Actual vs. 
Predicted responses are plotted and an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is 
shown indicating that the model is significant, with a p-value of < 0.0001.  
The “Prob>F” statistic shows the p-value of the test.  Since the p-value is 
smaller than 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis that the factors included in 
the regression have no effect on the response variable. 
We must now check the adequacy of the model based on the four assumptions, of 
which the model passes two.  Independence is satisfied because all iterations and all 
 73
design points were randomly chosen, and the residual mean is zero, as shown in  
Figure 23.  However, the residuals do not display constant variance (see Figure 23), nor 
are they normally distributed (see Figure 24). 
 
Figure 23.   Residual by Predicted plot of multiple-regression model of the Detect 
Time mean.  The mean of the residuals is 0, identified by the blue dashed 
line; however, the residuals display heteroscedasticity. 
 
Figure 24.   Distribution of the residual errors of the multiple-regression model of the 
Detect Time mean.  We fit the distribution to a normal curve in the right 
column of the figure.  Using the mean and standard deviation of the 
residuals, shown in the “Moments” column, JMP builds a fitted normal 
distribution.  We then perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Lillefors (KSL) 
Test for goodness of fit between the distribution of the residuals and the 
fitted normal distribution.  The “Prob>D” statistic shows the p-value of 
the test.  Since the p-value is smaller than 0.05, we reject the null 
hypothesis that the distribution of residuals is normal. 
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We attempt to correct the heteroscedasticity of the residuals by performing a 
transformation on the Detect Time and rerunning the forward AIC stepwise algorithm.  
We select a transformation to correct the nonconstant variance and nonnormality by 
trying several usual transformations including the log, square root, and exponential 
(Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 2006).  Ultimately, we choose the square root 
transformation because it best corrects the problems.  The resulting fitted model has a 
lower adjusted R2 of 0.402 (see Figure 25), but now passes the constant variance 
assumption (see Figure 26).  However, we were unable to meet the assumption of the 
residuals being normally distributed (see Figure 27). 
 
Figure 25.   Fitted model for Square Root of Detect Time mean.  Adjusted R2 is 0.402.  
Actual vs. Predicted responses are plotted and an Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) is shown indicating that the model is significant, with a p-value 




Figure 26.   Residual by Predicted plot of the multiple-regression model of the Square 
Root of Detect Time mean.  The mean of the residuals is 0, identified by 
the blue dashed line, and we have removed the heteroscedasticity. 
 
Figure 27.   Distribution of the residual errors of the multiple-regression model of the 
Square Root of Detect Time mean.  We fit the distribution to a normal 
curve and perform a KSL Test for goodness of fit, which the distribution 
fails. 
Even though our model violates the normality of residuals assumption, we present 
it regardless.  The factors within the model sorted by significance are presented in  
Figure 28.  Dairy surveillance parameters, especially the amount of delay between when 
a certain premises is inspected and when it is determined to be infected 
(DelayToDetection), are the most significant factors.  These three parameters all have  
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positive coefficients, which means that as they increase, so does the DetectTime mean.  
The LocalSpreadMultiplier, in contrast, has a negative coefficient.  So, as the local spread 
is allowed to spread longer distances, the detection time decreases. 
 
 
Figure 28.   Sorted Parameter Estimates of the Square Root of Detect Time mean 
model.  The “Term” column lists the factors used in the model.  The 
“Estimate” is the parameter estimate for the linear model, and the “Std 
Error” is the standard error of the parameter estimate.  The “t-Ratio” is the 
ratio of the parameter estimate to the standard error and is used as the test 
statistic when testing the factor’s importance to the model.  The horizontal 
bars graphically show the relative t-ratio of each factor in relation to the 
most important factor, while the Prob>|t| shows the probability of 
obtaining a t-ratio greater than the factor t-ratio at random.  This is called 
the p-value.  Overall, this figure shows the relative importance of the 
surveillance procedures at dairies to the mean detection time of the first 
detected premises.  Appendix A describes the parameters modeled in 
detail. 
4. Partition Tree Model 
We now compare our multiple-regression model to a partition tree.  As described 
earlier, the partition tree splits the factors sequentially in order to maximize the difference 
in the mean of continuous factors, or the probability of categorical factors, so that the 
nodes, or leaves, are as much alike as possible.  We choose to split the factors a total of 
27 times in order to achieve an R2 of 0.39; a similar explanation of the variance as the 
multiple-regression model.  The three most significant factors in the partition tree model 
are identical to the multiple-regression model, and include the three parameters 
describing the surveillance operations on dairy premises.  The first split in the model is 
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on the amount of delay between when premises are inspected and when they are 
determined to be infected (DelayToDetection).  The optimal split point is at 3.411.  This 
means that the average Detect Time of those design points tested in the model, which 
have DelayToDetection parameter settings of less than 3.411 days, are most different 
from those with settings above 3.411 days.  In this case, the mean Detect Time of those 
design points with the DelayToDetection setting below 3.411 is 5.23 days, and the mean 
of those design points above 3.411 is 6.67 days.  We display the contributions of the 
significant parameters in Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29.   Partition Tree model for Detect Time mean.  The “Term” column shows 
the most significant factors affecting the mean detection time.  Here, those 
factors are the surveillance operations on dairy premises.  The “Number of 
Splits” column shows how many times the partition tree was split on a 
factor.  The “SS” column shows the sum, over the multiple splits, of the 
squared differences between the two leaves into which the factor was split.  
Larger numbers show a larger distance between the means of the leaves.  
The horizontal bars simply show the relative contribution of the factors in 
terms of the first factor displayed.  For example, 525.2224 is 
approximately 20% of 2626.9895.  Therefore, the second bar is 
approximately 20% of the size of the first bar. 
E. MEAN NUMBER OF INFECTED PREMISES 
As discussed in Section A, the correlations between the MOEs we use are high.  
So, here we show the models developed for the mean number of infected premises as a 
proxy for the other MOE.  We first describe a multiple-regression model, followed by a 
partition tree. 
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1. Distribution of Infected Premises 
We begin by analyzing the distribution of the mean Infected Premises across all 
factors and starting scenarios (see Figure 30).  The mean is 466 premises, with a standard 
deviation of 1,324 premises, and the distribution is extremely right skewed.  The 
maximum mean number of infected premises is 7,700, which was the maximum we set in 
the control file of the simulation.  We explore this upper bound further in Section F. 
 
 
Figure 30.   Distribution of Infected Premises means across all factors and scenarios 
2. Multiple-Regression Model 
As we did in our analysis of Detection Time, we use a forward AIC stepwise 
technique to create the multiple-regression model.  We allow the algorithm to search 
through all noise and decision factor main effects and second order polynomials to 
develop a model.  The fitted model contains 52 terms that explain about 21% of the 




Figure 31.   Fitted model for Infected Premises mean.  Adjusted R2 is 0.213.  Actual 
vs. Predicted responses are plotted and an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
is shown, indicating that the model is significant, with a p-value of < 
0.0001. 
We now check the adequacy of the model based on the four assumptions, of 
which the model passes two.  Independence is satisfied because all iterations and all 
design points were randomly chosen, and the residual mean is zero, as shown in  
Figure 32.  However, the residuals do not display constant variance (see Figure 32), nor 





Figure 32.   Residual by Predicted plot of a multiple -egression model of the mean 
number of Infected Premises.  The mean of the residuals is 0, identified by 
the blue dashed line.  We have removed the heteroscedasticity. 
 
Figure 33.   Distribution of the residual errors of the multiple-regression model of the 
mean number of Infected Premises.  We fit the distribution to a normal 
curve and perform a KSL Test for goodness of fit, which the distribution 
fails. 
In order to address the constant variance and normality assumptions, we again 
attempt to transform the response variable with one of several methods described in 
Section D.3.  The usual transformations do not correct the problems, however, so we 
apply a Box-Cox transformation of the Infected Premises mean.  Box and Cox (1964) use 
a method of maximum likelihood to estimate a power to be applied to the response 




has an adjusted R2 of 0.323 (see Figure 34).  The transformation corrects the 
heteroscedasticity (see Figure 35) and the residuals appear normal, even though they fail 
the goodness of fit test (see Figure 36). 
 
Figure 34.   Fitted model for Box-Cox transformed Infected Premises mean.  Adjusted 
R2 is 0.323.  Actual vs. Predicted responses are plotted and an Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) is shown indicating that the model is significant with 
a p-value  
of < 0.0001. 
 
Figure 35.   Residual by Predicted plot of multiple regression model of the Box-Cox 
transformed mean number of Infected Premises.  The mean of the 




Figure 36.   Distribution of the residual errors of the multiple-regression model of the  
Box-Cox transformed mean number of Infected Premises.  We fit the 
distribution to a normal curve and perform a KSL Test for goodness of fit, 
which the distribution fails, even though the plots look fairly normal 
The factors within the model sorted by significance are presented in Figure 37.  
The four most significant factors to this model are all noise factors including the local 
spread, the probability of transmission, the overall movement distances, and some 
indirect movement types.  The most significant decision factors include the surveillance 
procedures at dairies, the size of the surveillance zone, the number of resources available 
to depopulate, and the length of time between the first detection and when the full amount 




Figure 37.   Sorted Parameter Estimates of the Box-Cox transformed mean number of 
Infected Premises model.  This shows that noise factors including the local 
spread, the probability of transmission, the overall movement distances, 
and some indirect movement types, are the most significant factors to the 
mean number of infected premises.  The most significant decision factors 
include the surveillance procedures at dairies, the size of the surveillance 
zone, the number of resources available to depopulate, and the length of 
time between the first detection and when the full amount of depopulation 
resources are available.  Appendix A describes the parameters modeled in 
detail. 
3. Partition Tree Model 
We again compare our multiple-regression model to a partition tree.  We choose 
to split the factors a total of 50 times in order to achieve an R2 of 0.31; a similar 
explanation of the variance as the multiple-regression model (see Figure 38).  The noise 
factors are still prevalent within the model, with the Local Spread Multiplier as the first 
split.  It splits at 1.5788, which is equivalent to stating that the distance bands for this 
parameter are increased from the base case of 1,000 m, 2,000 m, and 3,000 m to 1,578 m, 
3,157 m, and 4,736 m, respectively.  Interestingly, the parameter describing the total 
capacity to depopulate animals is the second split.  It splits for those observations with a 
Local Spread Multiplier of greater than 1.5788 at 0.638.  This is equivalent to having 
resources to depopulate 12,760 animals per day.  The detection probability for sheep in 
the surveillance zone is a factor that is not significant in any of the models up to this 
point, but is in this model. 
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Figure 38.   Partition Tree model for Infected Premises mean.  The most significant 
noise factors affecting the mean number of infected premises are the Local 
Spread Multiplier, the premises probability of transmission, and the 
detection probability of infected sheep in the surveillance zone.  The most 
significant decision factors are the number of resources available to 
depopulate, the amount of ramp-up time until all depopulation resources 
are available, and the amount of delay between surveillance visits at 
likeDairy premises after the first infected premises of the outbreak is 
detected. 
F. MODELS TO EXPLORE THE POTENTIAL FOR A LARGE OUTBREAK 
One concern we have with the multiple-regression and partition tree models for 
the mean number of Infected Premises is that we set a maximum number of this MOE 
within the simulation.  Because of this, we feel that the model may be underestimating 
the mean over all simulation iterations since outbreaks were stopped once the number of 
infected premises reached 7,700.  Therefore, we present a new MOE describing the 
percentage of times a design point reached 7,700 infected premises.  This MOE can be 
thought of as a surrogate for whether the design point has the potential to be a large 
outbreak.  In this section, we describe the results obtained with the new MOE using a 




1. Multiple-Regression Model 
We add another column to our data with the frequency that the design point 
reached the maximum number of infected premises out of the 100 iterations, and use this 
new column as the response variable in a multiple-regression model.  We exclude five 
out of the seven starting scenarios because they rarely reach the maximum infected 
premises limit and focus on those that do.  The starting scenarios modeled using this 
MOE are the High Animal Density, High Premises Density, and Port of San Francisco 
scenarios.  Again, we use a forward AIC stepwise technique, and allow the algorithm to 
search through all noise and decision factor main effects, two-way interactions, and 
second order polynomials to develop a model.  The fitted model contains 45 terms, which 
produces an adjusted R2 of 0.402 (see Figure 39). 
 
Figure 39.   Fitted model for Frequency Iterations with the Maximum Number of 
Infected Premises.  Adjusted R2 is 0.402.  Actual vs. Predicted responses 
are plotted and an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is shown indicating 
that the model is significant, with a p-value of < 0.0001. 
We again check the adequacy of the model based on the four assumptions, of 
which the model passes two.  Independence is satisfied because all iterations and all 
design points were randomly chosen, and the residual mean is zero.  However, the 
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residuals do not display constant variance, nor are they normally distributed.  Again, we 
attempt to transform the MOE using the usual methods, and ultimately use a log 
transformation to obtain the model shown in Figure 40.  The resulting model includes 45 
terms and produces an adjusted R2 of 0.50.  The transformed model now displays 
constant variance and the residuals appear normal, even though they fail the goodness of 
fit test (see Figures 41 and 42). 
 
Figure 40.   Fitted model for the Log of Frequency Iterations with the Maximum 
Number of Infected Premises.  Adjusted R2 is 0.50.  Actual vs. Predicted 
responses are plotted and an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is shown 
indicating that the model is significant with a p-value of < 0.0001. 
 
Figure 41.   Residual by Predicted plot of the multiple-regression model of the log 
transformed Frequency of Iterations with the Maximum Number of 
Infected Premises.  The mean of the residuals is 0, identified by the blue 
dashed line.  We have removed the heteroscedasticity. 
 87
 
Figure 42.   Distribution of the residual errors of the multiple-regression model log 
transformed Frequency of Iterations with the Maximum Number of 
Infected Premises.  We fit the distribution to a normal curve and perform a 
Shapiro-Wilk W Test for goodness of fit, which JMP uses when the 
number of data points is less than 2,000.  The distribution fails even 
though the plots appear fairly normal. 
The factors within the model sorted by significance are presented in Figure 43.  
The two most significant factors to this model—the local spread multiplier and the farm 
probability of transmission—remain the same as for the infected premises MOE 
discussed in Section E.  However, the next two most significant factors are now the 
decision factors depopulation resources available per day and the amount of ramp-up 
time until all depopulation resources are available.  The other significant factors are 




Figure 43.   Sorted Parameter Estimates of the log transformed Frequency of Iterations 
with the Maximum Number of Infected Premises model.  This shows that 
noise factors, including the local spread, the probability of transmission, 
the overall movement distances, and some indirect movement types, are 
the most significant factors to the model.  The most significant decision 
factors include the number of resources available to depopulate, the length 
of time between the first detection and when the full amount of 
depopulation resources are available, the surveillance procedures at 
dairies, and the size of the surveillance zone. 
2. Partition Tree Model 
We again compare our multiple-regression model to a partition tree.  We choose 
to split the factors a total of 20 times in order to achieve an R2 of 0.52, a similar 
explanation of the variance as the multiple regression model (see Figure 44).  The noise 
factors are still prevalent within the model, with the Local Spread Multiplier as the first 
split.  It splits at 1.5788, which is identical to the first split of the mean of Infected 
Premises partition tree.  The next split is on the length of time between the first detection 
and when the full amount of depopulation resources is available.  It splits for those 
observations with a Local Spread Multiplier of greater than 1.5788 at nine days.  The 
means of the two leaves created by this split are 10.49 for outbreaks, where the resources 
are available before 9 days, and 39.85 days for those greater than or equal to 9 days.  This 
is like saying that for those outbreaks whose local spread can reach distances of  
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approximately 4,700 m, having the full number of depopulation resources within nine 
days will, on average, reduce the number of times the model will reach 7,700 premises 
infected from 39.85 times to 10.49 times out of 100 iterations. 
 
 
Figure 44.   Partition Tree model for Infected Premises mean.  The most significant 
noise factors affecting the mean number of infected premises are the Local 
Spread Multiplier and the farm probability of transmission.  The most 
significant decision factors are the amount of ramp-up time until all 
depopulation resources are available, the number of resources available to 
depopulate, the general surveillance frequency of all non-dairy-like 
premises prior to the first premises of the outbreak is detected, and the 
amount of delay between surveillance visits at likeDairy premises after the 
first infected premises of the outbreak is detected. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of Chapter V should not be interpreted as individual predictions on 
outbreak scenarios.  Instead, we vary the model 400,000 times to attempt to indicate 
which parameters are the most important when modeling an outbreak in a modern,  
state-of-the-art simulator, ISP.  In Chapter I, we pose four research questions in order to 
focus our analysis.  Based on the results in Chapter V, we address those initial research 
questions as well as discuss a surprising finding about depopulation resources.  We 
organize the sections of this chapter in the following manner: 
 Disease Spread Parameters:  Which disease spread parameters are most 
important to the simulation of an outbreak of FMD in California? 
 Control Area and Surveillance Zone Sizes:  In response to a variety of 
outbreak scenarios, what are the optimal sizes of Control Areas and 
Surveillance Zones that efficiently eradicate the disease and also minimize 
the economic impact to the livestock industry? 
 Surveillance Procedures:  How often should livestock facilities be 
screened for FMD prior to and during an outbreak? 
 Starting Scenarios:  Of the outbreak scenarios modeled in this thesis, 
which are the most dangerous for California? 
 Depopulation Resources:  How do the availability and number of 
depopulation resources affect the spread of FMD in California? 
A. DISEASE-SPREAD PARAMETERS 
Several disease parameters affect all of the models we develop.  The three that 
seem most significant to our models are:  the Local Spread Multiplier, the All 
Movements Distance Multiplier, and the Farm Probability of Transmission.  Below, we 
discuss these disease-spread parameters, as well as a parameter we expected to be more 
significant—the movements between farms and markets. 
1. The Local Spread Multiplier is a significant factor in all of the 
regressions and all of the partition trees.  Its effect on the mean detection time is negative, 
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meaning that as the local spread is allowed to move farther away from the infected 
premises, the mean detection time decreases.  This is probably because the farther the 
virus moves, the more premises it comes in contact with.  This leads to more premises 
being infected and increases the all of the surveillance factors probabilities to detect the 
disease. 
The Local Spread Multiplier also has a significant effect on the size of the 
outbreaks, measured both by mean number of infected premises and by the frequency of 
iterations reaching 7,700 infected premises.  Both MOE partition trees split first on the 
Local Spread Multiplier and they split at the same point.  This suggests that there may be 
either an issue with the simulator at this distance of spread or that when the randomized 
premises were located during the development of the data, this distance was significant in 
the calculation.  Whether or not this distance is truly significant is difficult to determine 
since the locations of the premises are not exact.  The local spread parameter serves as a 
“catch all” parameter describing the spread of the disease when we are unable to 
determine a reason for a premises to be infected other than its proximity to another 
infected premises.  So, as we begin to understand more about how the virus spreads, the 
impact of the local spread parameter will likely be decreased because infections will be 
able to be attributed to other causes. 
2. The All Movements Distance Multiplier  
The all Movements Distance Multiplier is significant in all of the regression 
models, but is not significant in any of the partition trees.  This parameter is similar to the 
Local Spread Multiplier in that it controls how far movements of infected animals can 
travel, but it is different in that movements only occur at specific rates.  So, its effect on 
how many other premises are infected is less direct than the local spread parameter.  By 
being able to move greater distances, this parameter increases the chances that the virus 
will spread to a geographic area outside of the effect of local spread, or beyond the effect 
of implemented control measures.  This increases the probability that certain premises are 




restricted areas.  The other significant characteristic of this parameter is that its effect is 
greatly diminished once the first detection of infected premises is made and movement 
restrictions are put in place. 
3. The Farm Probability of Transmission  
The Farm Probability of Transmission is significant in all of the models, which is 
not surprising.  The higher the probability of transmission is, the larger the outbreak is, 
and the shorter the detection time is—since there is more disease to find.  The fact that 
this parameter shows up in all of our models is more of a confirmation that the simulation 
is running correctly than an insight into the disease spread. 
4. Market Movement Type 12  
Market Movement Type 12 was not a factor in any of our models.  This was 
likely because the experimental design did not sufficiently vary the market movement 
parameters and thus it is difficult to draw conclusions on their effects on the MOE.  
However, the preliminary results of the plausibility models described in Chapter III are 
consistent with the literature in showing that market movements are a significant 
contributor to FMD spread. 
B. CONTROL AREA AND SURVEILLANCE ZONE SIZES 
The sizes of the control area and the surveillance zone were not as significant to 
our models as we expected at the beginning of our research.  The size of the surveillance 
zone was always more significant than the size of the control area in our models.  This is 
counterintuitive since movement restrictions are tighter and surveillance for the disease is 
conducted more frequently in the control areas than in the surveillance zones.  It may be 
that since the disease parameters so dominated our models that the effects of these zone 
sizes seemed insignificant by comparison.  Perhaps once we have a better understanding 




Of the 35 surveillance factors we model, two types of surveillance seem to have 
the greatest significance in our models.  First, all forms of likeDairy surveillance 
consistently showed up as significant in our models.  This is probably because 
surveillance is done so frequently on these types of premises that if the virus does infect 
one of them, it is detected quickly and therefore controls can be instituted quickly.  
Second, the delay until detection parameters—especially on likeDairy premises, but also 
generally and on traced premises—was significant to all of the regression models and 
most of the partition trees.  This would indicate that one way to have an effect on limiting 
the size of the outbreak would be to prioritize dairy premises during lab testing so that the 
amount of time between initial testing and confirmation of the virus is kept to  
a minimum. 
D. STARTING SCENARIOS 
The most dangerous starting scenario in our model was the high animal density 
model, which is not surprising.  Our model reinforces the choice made by other 
researchers, which is to focus on these areas of California when modeling this disease.  
However, all of the starting scenarios were able to generate large outbreaks given the 
correct combinations of the other parameters.  Moreover, two scenarios—the high 
premises dense and the San Francisco Port—were able to consistently produce large 
outbreaks.  This would suggest that the areas in Northern California could also be 
important to study in more detail.  One could also argue that since the San Francisco Port 
is able to consistently produce large outbreaks, maintenance of surveillance resources at 
international ports is justified.  Since we did not observe the same consistency of large 
outbreaks from the Los Angeles Port scenario, however, we feel that additional 
exploration of port scenarios is needed before making that claim. 
E. DEPOPULATION RESOURCES 
Two decision factors that were consistently significant to our models were the two 
depopulation resource parameters that described how many resources were available per 
day and how quickly those resources could be available.  The partition trees split on these 
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parameters at about 12,000 animals per day and at a ramp-up time of less than nine days.  
These factors are probably so significant because there was not a preemptive culling 
strategy implemented in our model and because the local spread probabilities were not 
reduced based on detection of the disease on a premises.  So, in order to control the 
disease, depopulation resources had to be readily available in large supply to quickly 
depopulate premises that became infected.  If perfect biosecurity was established at the 
time of quarantine, and aerosol transmission was not a significant factor, then the disease 
should not spread from the premises.  Therefore, our conclusions about the depopulation 
resources are also linked to the fact that we did not model the effect of biosecurity on the 
local spread parameters.  Sensitivity analysis should be conducted to determine how these 
two parameters interact. 
F. SUMMARY 
Even though our models had relatively low adjusted R2 values, we believe they 
still give us a fair amount of insight into the characteristics of the spread and control of an 
FMD outbreak in California.  We believe that there are two major takeaways from our 
research for policymakers, and some for FMD researchers.  We present the former below, 
and the latter in Chapter VII. 
 The most important disease surveillance is done at likeDairy premises.  
We see the surveillance parameters of likeDairy premises as significant to 
both the detection time and size of outbreak regression models and 
partition trees.  This is likely because these types of premises usually have 
personnel on staff who have daily contact with their animals and that the 
clinical signs of infection in cattle are generally easier to detect than in 
other species.  These characteristics lead to decreased time until detection, 
which leads to quicker implementation of controls and smaller outbreaks.  
Continued research into how to make this type of surveillance as efficient 
as possible could have a significant impact on how large an outbreak 
becomes if it ever occurs in California. 
 96
 The size and availability of depopulation resources are significant in all of 
the size of outbreak models.  Unlike many other authors’ models and due 
to our understanding of the current views in California, we do not use 
preemptive depopulation in our model.  Since we only depopulate detected 
premises and do not explore the effects of biosecurity on the local spread 
from those premises, we must accomplish depopulation as efficiently as 
possible to prevent or limit the spread of the disease.  This requires the 
availability of large amounts of resources in a timely matter.  Our model 
suggests the amount of resources necessary could be the ability to 
depopulate over 12,000 animals per day within nine days of the first 
detection of infected livestock premises.  If the state does not plan on 
using preemptive depopulation, then this magnitude of depopulation 
resources should be readily available on a very short ramp-up timeline to 
facilitate the rapid control of an FMD outbreak. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
We feel that there are several areas where our research could be improved.  When 
discussing the benefits of a simulation experimental design, Sanchez (2008, p. 83) writes,  
“This process typically follows an iterative cycle, where insights gained from 
simulation experiments can be used in many ways.  Results can be used to 
evaluate or improve the simulation model.  By identifying important factors, 
interactions, and nonlinear effects, the experimenter can improve their 
understanding, find robust solutions, or raise questions to be explored in 
subsequent experiments.  Thresholds, plateaus, or other interesting features of the 
response surfaces might provide guidance about situations that are particularly 
good (or particularly bad).” 
This thesis is one step in the iterative cycle of which Sanchez writes.  During the 
rest of this chapter, we will discuss the changes that are needed or which would be 
interesting to explore in the ISP control file, the experimental design, the output statistics, 
and more general areas we feel should be further researched regarding the spread of FMD 
in California. 
A. ISP CONTROL FILE 
The development of the ISP control file was a difficult task due to the complexity 
and sheer number of parameters included in our simulation.  Below is a list of the 
changes or fixes we recommend to those who would conduct follow-on research using 
ISP to model an outbreak of FMD in California. 
 Parameterize Dairy Tanker movement as “Fixed Routes”:  Our results 
indicate that the diary premises in California have a significant impact on 
FMD control, and those premises also make up a large part of California’s 
agricultural economic output.  Our model could be improved by 
specifically modeling the movements of vehicles on and off of dairy 
premises.  Data on tanker movements would be extremely useful, whether 
 98
gathered from industry groups, where the data resides, or from 
government organizations interested in controlling FMD. 
 Parameterize Airborne Spread:  Airborne spread can be an important 
factor for some FMD serotypes (Stevenson, 2012).  Future models could 
benefit from adding predominant winds within the state.  This may be 
especially important for areas of the state that are not within a “local 
spread” distance from a large farm, which can produce significant virus 
plumes, but may be downwind of one that is farther away. 
 Surveillance Zone Parameters:  In our base control file, we did not 
correctly use the option to preempt a premises being added to the 
surveillance zone if it had already been added to a control area.  This did 
not affect our results since we corrected for this oversight in the output 
data.  Future researchers should set the parameter “ExcludeFarmsInZones” 
to the zone name for the control area. 
 County Zones:  Radial zones are difficult to manage during an outbreak 
and would not generally be used under USDA guidelines (USDA, 2011).  
More likely, counties or similar-sized areas would be designated as certain 
zones or areas.  ISP does not currently have the functionality to apply 
zones in this manner, but there may be ways to accomplish this in future 
updates to the software. 
 Restricting Movements on Farm Class:  Our model restricts all 
movements within a zone equally after the first detection of infected 
premises.  This is perhaps not the best strategy given that some premises 
are more infectious, or have other applicable characteristics, than others.  
If strategies can be found that reduce the impact of movement restrictions 
on some premises, the overall impact on the California livestock industry 




movement restrictions actually hurt a livestock premises and then attempt 
to minimize the overall economic impact on the state, as opposed to 
surrogates such as the number of premises affected or infected. 
 Probabilities of Contact Between Farm Types:  Our model does not use 
the “RestrictOnAnimalType” or “RestrictOnFarmClass” parameters for 
direct and indirect movements.  These parameters allow the user to specify 
restrictions to the destinations of specific movements.  An example of this 
type of restriction is for direct contact movements originating from small 
swine premises to only be allowed to have destinations at other swine 
premises.  Or, more specifically, for those same movements to only be 
allowed to have destinations at other small swine premises.  We did not 
use them due to the complexity they add, as well as the fact that only one 
animal type is present on each of the premises in our data.  However, 
adding these parameters would more closely resemble actual contact 
between premises. 
 Regional Movement Standstill:  Pineda-Krch et al. (2010) found that 
setting up a statewide movement ban on all livestock movements was 
beneficial in their research.  While we believe that a statewide ban may 
not be necessary, given the large distances between livestock production 
regions within the state, we feel that future research should compare the 
impact of statewide “movement standstills” to more regionalized 
movement restrictions such as overlapping northern, central, and southern 
regions.  ISP does have parameters to allow for such a comparison. 
 Regional California Dataset:  Due to the number of and geographic 
distances between the premises in our dataset, the development of smaller 
regional models, or a small mock “California,” would allow closer 
examination of each factor.  This may also help to more easily evaluate 
model behavior and identify problems with parameterization or bugs in the 
implementation of the software. 
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B. DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT (DOE) 
The most difficult part of designing the experiment was in setting the high and 
low limits of each parameter studied.  Based on the results of our model, we suggest the 
following modifications to the DOE: 
 Surveillance Rates:  The surveillance rates’ high and low limits were 
generally set fairly wide apart in order to estimate their overall effect 
within the model.  Now that we understand their importance to the model, 
more thought and expertise should be applied towards finding more 
realistic rates for each surveillance type.  This could then give more 
fidelity to where limited surveillance resources should be applied. 
 Farm Probability of Transmission:  Our DOE currently applies low and 
high limits on farm probability of transmission from sheep and goats to 
0% and 50%, respectively.  We then apply a function to that probability in 
order to determine the probabilities for cattle and swine farms.  After 
further review, this function for cattle may not allow probabilities to be as 
high as they should be when modeling direct and indirect contact between 
animals.  We believe the exponent used should be closer to 15 instead of 
1.82, in order to better model how much virus is shed by cattle by means 
other than aerosol, which is how we determine the current exponent used 
in the function. 
 Rate of Market Movement:  McLaws and Ribble (2007) propose that the 
factor that contributes most to an FMD outbreak becoming a large is virus 
movement through markets.  However, we do not vary the number of 
farm-to-market movements per time period in our current design due to 
insufficient understanding of this parameter in the literature.  Future 
research should vary this rate based on subject matter expert 
understanding or funding should be made available to collect data in order 
to better understand the spread of the virus prior to the first detection of 
infected premises. 
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 Local Spread Multiplier Limits:  As discussed in Chapter VI, local 
spread is a dominant factor within our model.  Since the first splits within 
all the partition trees we use in our analysis are on a local spread multiplier 
of approximately 1.6, which equates to a maximum distance band of 
roughly 4,800 m, it may merit checking the ISP software for 
idiosyncrasies at around the 5,000 m value.  If such an anomaly exists 
within the software, our model may have more reliable results if the 
maximum local spread distance can be kept under that size. 
 Greater SME Input and Review:  The DOE high and low limits were set 
to widely vary the parameter settings as a first step in observing the effects 
of those factors.  Now that we understand a bit more about these effects, 
SMEs should be used to narrow these ranges and therefore obtain more 
realistic outbreak results.   
C. ADDITIONAL OUTPUT 
In order to organize the simulation output for analysis, we use several scripts to 
read the output files developed by ISP during the simulation and calculate the MOEs we 
use for our analysis.  Knowing the results of our analysis, we believe that three additional 
measures should be calculated by this script in order to further our understanding of the 
outbreaks simulated. 
 Day of last infection and/or day of last detection during each 
simulation iteration:  Currently, our model does not have a way to 
measure if or when the outbreak ended during the course of the 
simulation.  For example, setting a time period of a certain number of 
days, say 28 days, since a detection would declare the epidemic over.  
Having this information would allow us to better understand the 
effectiveness of the control strategies. 
 The number of infected premises when the first detection occurs 
during each iteration:  We believe that we would better understand the 
relationship between the outbreak size and detection time if we knew how 
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fast the silent spread, the disease spread prior to first detection, is moving.  
Our belief is that when the outbreak spreads quickly, the virus is easier to 
detect.  This is because we sample the susceptible population at a certain 
rate, and when more premises are infected, the time it takes to find an 
infected facility decreases.  Having the number of infected premises and 
the types of those premises at the first detection would allow us to more 
fully explore this belief. 
 The locations of the randomly selected initially infected premises:  
These locations should have been preserved in order to conduct some 
additional location-based analysis.  We believe our starting scenarios do a 
good job of capturing the outbreak characteristics based on densities of 
animals or premises, but may not fully capture the geographic 
characteristics of California.  Having more information about the exact 
initially infected premises location may better inform this area. 
 The projected number of infected premises when an iteration reaches 
the maximum number of infected premises:  Since our iterations were 
cut off when the number of infected premises reached 7,700, we had to 
develop a surrogate MOE to study the largest outbreaks.  If the number of 
infected premises could be accurately projected, a surrogate MOE would 
not have to be used. 
D. GENERAL RESEARCH 
This thesis makes several assumptions because of either our lack of understanding 
or by an absence in the literature of several areas impacting a potential outbreak of FMD 
or any foreign animal disease in California.  In this section, we describe two areas we feel 
need additional emphasis, research, or published information by the scientific community 
to inform the modeling of livestock diseases in the state. 
 Better knowledge of facility locations/species mix:  Because the data we 
used to construct our model were developed from publicly available, 
county-level aggregated statistics of livestock premises, they only 
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approximate the locations, sizes, animal types, and production types of the 
livestock premises in the state.  Since ISP uses all of these characteristics 
to determine how the virus spreads, if the actual characteristics differ 
greatly from the approximate characteristics, the virus spread could also 
vary greatly. 
E. KNOWLEDGE OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT MOVEMENT RATES AT 
LOCATIONS OUTSIDE OF CENTRAL CALIFORNIA:   
Since the direct and indirect movement distances and probabilities were generated 
from a study of only central California, we may be over or underestimating the outbreaks 
in other areas of the state.  Having better knowledge of these movements in other areas 
could help in better defining high-risk locations/regions of the state. 
F. FINAL REMARKS 
FMD is a fast-moving disease with potentially catastrophic consequences for 
California and the United States.  It is important that policy makers are prepared to 
respond effectively and immediately if and when an outbreak occurs.  Circumstances and 
details of an outbreak can greatly affect the behavior and consequences.  There will not 
be time for model development during a crisis, so timely analysis requires having the 
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APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTION OF THE DESIGN OF 
EXPERIMENT 
Factor name
Level Used in 
Plausiblity 
Model Low Level High Level Factor Description Methodology/Reference
MovementType1:NumberPerTimePeriod[114|
214|314|24|34]


















0.32 0.01 0.6267 Movement_Farm_Farm_Sheep:  Direct Contact 
movement rate from Sheep premises.  Poisson 
Distribution with means varied between low and high 







































































































































































































LocalSpread1:RelativeSusceptibility[swine] 0.01 0.001 0.1 Suceptability of swine to local spread relative to cattle. Reference (Donaldson et al., 2001; Alexanderson and 
Donaldson, 2002).
LocalSpread1:RelativeSusceptibility[sheep] 0.05 0.005 0.5 Suceptability of sheep to local spread relative to cattle. Reference (Donaldson et al., 2001; Alexanderson and 
Donaldson, 2002).
LocalSpread1:RelativeSusceptibility[goat] 0.05 0.005 0.5 Suceptability of goat to local spread relative to cattle. Reference (Donaldson et al., 2001; Alexanderson and 
Donaldson, 2002).








Infectivity1:Infectivity[][][]:DecreaseStart 17.00 12 22 The day after infection when infectivity begins to 
decrease on the premise.
Infectivity1:Infectivity[][][]:DecreaseEnd 33.00 28 38 The day when the premise becomes immune.
Zone2:OutsideRadius1:ControlArea 10001 1 20000 Control Measure:  Outside radius of the control area in 
meters.
Zone3:OutsideRadius1:VaccZone 10000 0 20000 Control Measure: Outside radius of the vaccination zone 
in meters.
Zone4:OutsideRadius1:SurvZone 25000 0 50000 Control Measure: Outside radius of the Surveillance 
zone in meters.
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APPENDIX B. INTERSPREADPLUS CONTROL FILE 
;InteSpread Plus Control File Editor v2 


















































Column3=user_defined FIPS_Code long 






Column10=user_defined Type_Name string 
Column11=user_defined premise_3k long 
Column12=user_defined premise_10k long 
Column13=user_defined premise_20k long 
Column14=user_defined animal_3k long 
Column15=user_defined animal_10k long 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MovementTypes=IDMovement_Size1 IDMovement_Size2 IDMovement_Size3 


















MovementTypes=IDMovement_Size1 IDMovement_Size2 IDMovement_Size3 


















SourceFarmStates=!detected | detected 
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